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The Competition Commission’s Non-Referral of Exclusivity Clauses in a Shopping 
Centre Lease Context: A Monumental Misjudgement 




“EXCLUSIVITIES AND LETTING RESTRICTIONS 
 
10.1 Save for the Supermarket [Pick n Pay] and Checkers, the lessor shall not permit 
the following businesses to be conducted in the shopping centre on the property: 
 
 10.1.1  a hypermarket or supermarket; or 
 
10.1.2 a store with either a single or several food departments, the 
aggregate square meterage of which exceeds 100 (one hundred) 
meters; or 
 
 10.1.3  a café or delicatessen which sells fresh fish or meat; or 
 
10.1.4 a grocery, fresh fish shop, butchery, bakery or fruit and vegetable 
shop.” 
 
The above clause embodies a typical construction of the suspect of anticompetitiveness 
upon which this paper focuses. 
 
This paper focuses on the common practice in commercial agreements of including 
exclusivity clauses in shopping centre lease agreements between a supermarket anchor 
tenant and the landlord of a shopping centre. It is the contention of this paper that such 
clauses are anticompetitive when considered specifically in light of section 5(1) of the 
South African Competition Act.1 In reaching this conclusion, relevant sections of the Act 
will be interpreted and analysed in the pertinent context, as will relevant case law and 
comparable foreign jurisprudence. The findings of South Africa’s Competition 
Commission in 2013 with regard to the competitive nature of exclusivity clauses in the 
context of section 5(1), and the basis for their findings will be scrutinised. A conclusion, 
warranted and supported by the inferences drawn from an analysis of the aforementioned 
sources (legislation, case law and foreign jurisprudence), will be reached accordingly in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 89 of 1998 (the Act). 
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support of a stance of resistance against exclusivity clauses in shopping centre leases 
between landlord and supermarkets. An argument in favour of a blanket prohibition of 
exclusivity clauses in shopping centre leases due to their anticompetitive nature that 
outweighs their efficiencies and justifications according to section 5(1) of the Act, is the 
predominant direction of this paper. Additionally, pertinent elements and theories of 
competition law in general will be stated and analysed in order to support this 
aforementioned contention, as well as the other various contentions made. Similarly, 
discourse regarding the cultural conditions of certain markets will be presented in order to 
adequately justify the competition law contentions made.  
 
An appropriate point of departure is to first examine the backdrop against which the Act 
was formulated and the motives and goals that the Act aims to achieve. The nature of 
exclusivity clauses in the lease agreement context, the incentive to include them for both 
the lessor and the lessee, and the repercussions that they produce for both the lessor and the 
lessee, will be examined thereafter. 
The Purpose of Competition Law Enforcement: Section 2 of the Competition Act 
 
Section 2 of the Competition Act states that: 
 
The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order –  
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
(c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans; 
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and 
(f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. 
 
It is with this rhetoric as a backdrop that one is able to judge whether specific conduct or 
transactions are anticompetitive and thus justify a claim under the Act. This section, 
embodying the Act’s purposes, is unique in the sense that it includes both the traditional 
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efficiency motives that can be found in the United States (U.S.) and European Union 
(E.U.) antitrust regimes, as well as certain novel and innovative objectives which are 
tailored to meet the requirements of the South African competition regime given the 
historical context from which the country comes.  
 
The discussion that follows includes an examination of the various functions that 
competition laws serve in different jurisdictions, as well as the primary focus of the 
competition laws in each respective jurisdiction considered. The individualistic and 
‘mixed’ nature of the content intrinsic to South Africa’s Competition policy will be 
examined, compared to other jurisdictions, and accounted for. The intended outcome of 
this enquiry is to reveal that South Africa’s unique competition policy does not equate 
harm to competition merely with harm to efficiency or harm to the competitive process, 
but includes under the umbrella of harm to competition a lack of fairness and a lack of 
protection of competitors from competition. 
The Focus of the Antitrust Laws in Other Jurisdictions – A Study by Eleanor Fox2 
 
Fox advances an analysis of the different priorities and areas of focus of various 
jurisdictions. This analysis places into perspective both the originality as well as 
conformity that exist in the priorities of the South African Competition Act. Fox proposes 
that there are three categories relevant to the consideration of whether certain conduct 
harms competition, each incidentally reflective of certain jurisdictions’ competition law 
regimes either in whole or part or a combination thereof.  
The United States of America: Harm to Competition is Harm to Efficiency; The Only 
Anticompetitive Harm is an Output-Limiting Harm3 
 
“‘Consumer welfare’ and ‘output limitation’ became words that anchored the 
conversation of antitrust, [with] ‘consumer welfare’ [being] the label given for the 
raison d’etre of the new regime…”4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Eleanor Fox is the Professor of Trade Regulation at New York University School of Law. 
3 Eleanor M. Fox ‘We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors’ (2003) 26 (2) World Competition 149 
at 151 (Efficiency, in this context means the artificial limitation of output and rise in price). 
4 Ibid. 
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The first category that Fox explores defines harm to competition in terms of the outcome 
of the particular conduct or transaction; in other words, whether output of the relevant 
product will probably be artificially reduced and prices will rise as a result.5 Therefore, in 
terms of this category, the primary purpose of the competition laws are to regulate or 
prohibit conduct or transactions that artificially reduce product output resulting in an 
increase in price.6 The jurisdiction most closely affiliated with these concerns is (as 
recognised by Fox, and as can be gleaned upon an examination of the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of the United States) the U.S., whose primary purpose of the antitrust laws 
is to promote consumer welfare by banning economically inefficient transactions and 
practices,7 and to ensure the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces which are 
thought to result in the most desirable allocation of resources, namely the lowest prices and 
highest quality of goods for consumers. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc.8 White, J laid precedent by stating that a restraint or transaction 
is subject to the per se illegality rule (an thus deemed to be an unreasonable restraint on 
trade for the purposes of s 1 of the Sherman Act9) if it is one that would always, or almost 
always, tend to restrict competition and decrease output, as opposed to one that would 
increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.10 This 
precedent was followed in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of 
University of Oklahoma11 where Stevens, J stated that “[…] by curtailing output and 
blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA 
has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s 
life”; this detriment to consumers was considered an unreasonable restraint on trade. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Supra (n3) at 150. 
6 This rationale is premised both on the theory of ‘economies of scale’, which reasons that the greater the 
quantity of a good produced, the lower the cost of producing the good will be, which will result in a lower 
selling price of the good to consumers. In addition, a reduction in product output will result in an increase in 
consumer demand for that product, which will result in an increase in consumer willingness to pay a higher 
price for that sparse product; this increase in willingness will be an incentive for producers to increase the 
price. 
7 Robert Pitofsky, Harvey J. Goldschmid & Diane P. Wood Trade Regulation: Cases and Materials 6 ed 
(2010) 6. 
8 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (BMI). 
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
10 BMI op cit (n8) at 19. 
11 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (NCAA) at 120. 
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Similarly, in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,12 it was held that the withholding 
from customers of a service that they desire was considered an anticompetitive reduction 
of output. In California Dental Association v Federal Trade Commission13 Souter, J for the 
Supreme Court of the United States, stated: “In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. 
Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) we held that a ‘naked 
restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification…’” Another case 
reflective of this stance is that of Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C.14 where Seventh Circuit 
Judge Wood held that the policy implemented by Toys “R” Us, which pressurised 
suppliers to limit the supply of popular toys to warehouse clubs, was an output limitation 
to the warehouse clubs that diminished consumer welfare by denying the clubs (who were 
the consumers in this vertical scenario) merchandise, forcing them to buy products they did 
not want and frustrating end-consumers’ ability to make direct price comparisons of club 
prices and Toys “R” Us prices;15 this output-limiting harm to consumer welfare was 
considered anticompetitive harm.  
 
The aforementioned forms part of, but is not limited to, the U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that exists, that supports the notion of product output reduction as an 
underpinning of U.S. antitrust law enforcement as proposed by Fox. 
 
The U.S. approach above is one that is associated with the Chicago School, which puts 
consumer welfare at the forefront of antitrust enforcement, intervention being justified in 
the event of inefficiency - inefficiency in the sense of artificially reducing output and 
raising price.16 The Chicago School assigned to competition the primary objective of 
promoting economic efficiency, meaning the optimisation of allocative and productive 
efficiency: allocative efficiency existing when productive resources are used for the 
purposes that consumers value most or when all the demand on the market is satisfied; 
productive efficiency existing when the productive resources are used in a fashion such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 476 U.S. 447, (1986) (Indiana Federation of Dentists) at 459. 
13 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (California Dental Association) at 763. 
14 221 F.3d 928 (2000) (Toys R Us). 
15 Pitofsky op cit (n7) 487. 
16 Fox op cit (n3) 152. 
	   6	  
that they reduce their costs in an optimal manner,17 thereby reducing the eventual price for 
consumers. Under the Chicago School approach, antitrust enforcement does not concern 
itself with the protection of small firms from the exclusionary conduct of larger firms, 
instead asserting that if the former are excluded by the latter due to vigorous competition in 
the form of increased efficiency or innovation which leads to increased consumer welfare, 
the latter would not be in violation of the antitrust laws.18 
 
As will be discussed below, the abovementioned focus on efficiency and output-limitation 
is not entirely ignored by the objects clause of the South African Act, and its objectives can 
thus be likened to those of the U.S. However, with regard to the objective of protecting 
competitors from competition, the U.S. stands in stark contrast to the position held by the 
South African Act and the jurisprudence that emerged in this regard. The Supreme Court 
of the United States, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States19 unequivocally stated that “it is 
competition, not competitors, which the Act protects”,20 and this was confirmed in, inter 
alia, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,21 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc. 22  and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 23  This 
confirmation that harm from competition can never be a violation of U.S. antitrust law, and 
that mere unfairness to a competitor does not present an antitrust problem,24 presents a 
blatant difference in the priorities of the U.S. antitrust laws and those of South Africa’s.25 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 William E. Kovacic ‘The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: 
The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix’ (2007) 1 (1) Columbia Business Law Review 1 at 22; Damien Geradin, 
Anne Layne-Farrar & Nicolas Petit EU Competition Law and Economics 1 ed (2012) 73. 
18 Simon Roberts ‘Competition Policy, Competitive Rivalry and a Developmental State in South Africa’ in 
Omano Edigheji (ed) Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa Potentials and 
Challenges (2010) 227. 
19 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (Brown Shoe). 
20 Brown Shoe supra (n19) at 344. 
21 495 U.S. 328 (1990) at 338. 
22 429 U.S. 477 (1977) at 488. 
23 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (Brooke Group). 
24 Fox op cit (n3) 154. 
25 The specific details of this difference will be discussed under the heading: Developing Countries – The 
Significance of Fairness: Harm to Competition Includes Harm to the Competitive Dynamic Among Small 
Firms; Competition Laws Protect Competitors from Competition. 
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The European Union: Competition Laws Protect the Competitive Structure and 
Operation of Market Mechanisms 
 
“[The competition laws] protect openness of markets, access to markets, and the 
right of market actors not to be fenced out by dominant firm strategies not based on 
competitive merits.”26  
 
“[D]o would-be entrepreneurs have equal or ‘fair’ access to the means necessary to 
attempt a creative breakthrough? Do successful competitors in innovative processes 
have a ‘fair’ return for their efforts, or access to a ‘fair’ mechanism for determining 
rewards?”27  
 
The second category advanced by Fox defines harm to competition in terms of conduct or 
transactions that undermine the market mechanism, including unjustified exclusionary 
practices.28 In other words, conduct that jeopardises the competitive process in a market 
will warrant a competition law claim, in the absence of proof of a procompetitive 
justification. Under this category, the primary purpose of the competition laws is to ensure 
that the markets are free from conduct that classifies as anticompetitive obstructions. The 
protection of the market in this manner has a follow-on effect of consumer advantage 
since, as Frédéric Jenny explains, “more market competition means that the efficiency 
gains in production and distribution are passed on to consumers and that innovations reach 
the market place.”29 Similarly, The European Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, 
states that “the fundamental role of the market and of competition [is] guaranteeing 
consumer welfare, encouraging the optimal allocation of resources and granting to 
economic agents the incentives to pursue productive efficiency, quality and innovation.”30 
 
Taking into consideration the above justifications for EU Competition law, the similarities 
between the EU and US models become manifest, specifically with respect to the fact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Fox op cit (n3) 155. 
27 Paul Geroski and Alexis Jacquemin ‘Dominant Firms and their Alleged Decline’ (1984) 2 (1) International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 22. 
28 Fox op cit (n3) 150. 
29 Frédéric Jenny ‘Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Covergence, Divergence and Cooperation’ 
in Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsushita (eds) Competition Policy in the Global Trading System: 
Perspectives from the EU, Japan and the USA (2002) 297. 
30 Barry Hawk (ed) International Antitrust Law & Policy: 2000 Fordham Corporate Law Institute (2001) 
257. 
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consumer welfare and efficiency considerations are the primary concerns of competition 
law enforcement. There are differences, however, and those materialize in the form of the 
most appropriate means via which the common, primary concerns are to be addressed and 
advanced. For the United States, artificial output-limitation - the primary concern that is 
sought to be addressed - is the essence of anticompetitive behaviour that jeopardises 
consumer welfare and efficiency, and thus regulation focusing primarily thereon is the 
ideal manner in which the purpose of competition law is to be achieved. For the European 
Union, on the other hand, conduct that threatens the open market, and competitive process 
unimpeded by private firm obstructions is the essence of anticompetitive behaviour, and 
are the primary concerns sought to be addressed; thus regulation that focuses primarily on 
addressing those elements is the ideal manner to achieve the purpose of competition law.  
 
There exists in the European regime pertinent regulations aimed at achieving the 
aforementioned purposes. Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome31 establishing the European 
Communities prohibits the abuse of dominance thereby regulating the behaviour of 
dominant firms so that they do not unfairly use their power and take undue advantage of 
other market players such as buyers, sellers and competitors.32 Similarly, Article 3(1) 
explicitly recognises the protectionist objective of the competition laws by requiring a 
system that ensures competition in the internal market is not distorted, thereby condemning 
unjustified exclusionary practices as having the result of distorting the normal functioning 
of the market on competitive merits.33 
 
A significant illustration of the Court of Justice’s contempt towards conduct that impairs 
undistorted competition on the common market, is inherent in the judgment of Hoffmann-
La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities.34 The court states that a 
contract between two manufacturer competitors whereby the one agrees to buy its product 
exclusively from the other above the former’s own manufacturing capacity, is 
“incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition within the common market, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 1957. 
32 Fox op cit (n3) 157. 
33 Fox supra (n33) at 156. 
34 Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461 (Hoffmann-La Roche). 
	   9	  
because [it is] not based on an economic transaction which justifies this burden or benefit 
but, [is] designed to deprive the purchaser of, or restrict his possible choices of supply, and 
to deny other producers access to the market.” 35  In Tetra Pak International SA v 
Commission of the European Communities,36 a dominant manufacturing firm implemented 
unjustifiable37 tying and exclusive dealing contracts. The Court of Justice confirmed the 
Court of First Instance’s declaration that a firm in a dominant position who implements the 
practices of exclusive dealing or tying, is abusing its position since it is depriving 
customers of the ability to choose their sources of supply and denying other producers 
access to the market.38 The Court of Justice acknowledged and applied Article 86, which 
requires special responsibilities of a dominant firm such as Tetra Pak, who has “freedom of 
conduct compared with other economic operators, […] such as to impose on it a special 
responsibility under Article 86 to maintain genuine undistorted competition on those 
markets.”39   
 
In sum, the focus of the EU competition laws can, therefore, be likened to the 
idiosyncrasies of the Chicago School abovementioned, but only in part, since the most 
characteristic feature of the EU regime’s focus is on the right of market actors to enjoy 
access to the market on their merits and to ensure that non-dominant firms have the 
freedom to trade without artificial obstruction by dominant firms; The preservation of this 
freedom is integral to the legitimacy of the competition process and stands to benefit all 
market players including competitors and consumers.40 This is not to say, however, that 
US law does not protect against harm to the dynamic and beneficial facets of the 
competition process at all, unless the effect of output-limitation is evident in the 
exclusionary practice: in Indiana Federation of Dentists the Supreme Court held that the 
dentists’ conduct disrupted the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Hoffmann-La Roche supra (n34) at para 90. 
36 C-333/94P, [1996] ECR I-5951 (Tetra Pak). 
37 The test to determine whether the practice is justifiable comes from Stergio Delimitis v Henninger Bräu 
AG, [1991] ECR I-935 para 21-27 where it must first be asked whether the restraint or conduct has a 
‘sealing-off’effect’, making access to the market difficult; if the answer is in the affirmative then the restraint 
or conduct is anticompetitive and must be objectively justified (Fox op cit (n3) 158). 
38 Tetra Pak op cit (n36) at para 137. 
39 Tetra Pak supra (n38) at para 22. 
40 Fox op cit (n3) 157-158. 
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market by deciding themselves that customers did not need that which they demanded.41 
When one is cognisant of the general trends, however, it can be said, with a degree of 
confidence, that the concerns of output limitation and protection of the competitive process 
are at the forefront of the focus of the US and EU regimes respectively. 
Developing Countries – The Significance of Fairness: Harm to Competition Includes 
Harm to the Competitive Dynamic Among Small Firms; Competition Laws Protect 
Competitors from Competition42 
Under the regime of many developing countries, Fox notes, is an approach to 
anticompetitive conduct that is informed by fairness. Fairness, in this context, is a standard 
used to protect competitors from competition itself. The Indonesian case of Indomaret43 
involving the proposed development of larger franchise stores that stood to jeopardise the 
preservation of small, independent stores, effectively illustrates the fairness principle: the 
former were enjoined by the Indonesian Competition Commission in order to protect 
against the destruction of traditional local communities. 44  Fox encapsulates the fairness 
doctrine by noting that ‘the Commission may have perceived that the social costs to the 
people as citizens of the local communities were greater than the gains from low prices and 
variety realized by the people in their role as consumers.’45  Therefore, as Fox succinctly 
categorises competition policies of this type: harm to competition includes harm from low 
prices or other efficient strategies that directly benefit consumers.46 This additional focus 
on fairness as opposed to a sole focus of consumer welfare in a competition law regime, 
stands in sharp contrast to the US and Chicago School approaches discussed in the above 
paragraphs. 
 
The case for a fairness component in competition law and policy was memorably made by 
Kyu-Uck Lee47 where he explained that if the outcome of competition is to be accepted by 
the society at large, then the process of competition must not only be free but also conform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Indiana Federation of Dentists op cit (n12) at 461-462. 
42 Fox op cit (n3) 162. 
43 P.T. Indomarco Prismatama, 03/KPPU-L-1/2000. 
44 Fox op cit (n3) 163. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Fox op cit (n3) 150. 
47 Professor Lee was then the president of the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade and 
Chairman of the Competition Advisory Board for the Korean Fair Trades. 
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to a social norm; that is, it must also be fair.48 If it is not fair, Lee continues, ‘the freedom 
to compete loses its intrinsic value. Fair competition must go in tandem with free 
competition. These two concepts embody one and the same value. This may be the reason 
that competition laws of several countries […] clearly specify “fair and free competition” 
as their crown objective.’49 Lee then places the fairness component and its import in the 
specific context of developing countries: 
 
‘In a developing economy where […] economic power is not fairly distributed, 
competition policy must play the dual role of raising the power […] of 
underprivileged economic agents to become viable participants in the process of 
competition on the one hand, and of establishing the rules of free and fair 
competition on the other. If these two rules are not met, unfettered competition will 
simply help a handful of privileged big firms to monopolize domestic markets that 
are usually protected through import restrictions. This will then give rise to public 
dissatisfaction since the game itself has not been played in a socially acceptable, 
fair manner.50 
 
The fundamental notion that should be extracted from Professor Lee’s position, is that 
cultural and normative conditions affect the discourse of competition policy and what is 
considered to be anticompetitive. The relation of Professor Lee’s observations to the 
unique, ‘hybrid’ nature of South African competition law, particularly its focuses and 
functions, is particularly appreciable. 
South African Competition Law – An Amalgamation of Efficiency and Social 
Objectives 
 
“The Act reflects the government’s aims to incorporate particular public interest 
policies that reflect the changing socio/economic and political context within which 
the Act was promulgated.”51 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Kyu-Uck Lee ‘A “Fairness” Interpretation of Competition Policy with Special Reference to Korea’s Laws’ 
in The Symposium in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the Fair Trade Commission 
in Japan, Competition Policy for the21st Century (1997) 61 KFTC (on file with author) 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Kim Kampel ‘The Role of South African Competition Law in Supporting SMEs: Can David really take on 
Goliath?’ 1 - Summary of a paper prepared for 48th ICSB World Conference “Advancing Entrepreneurship 
and Small Businesses” 15-18 June 2003, Belfast, Northern Ireland, available at 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Speeches/kim.pdf accessed on 18 February 2015. 
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Lewis describes the South African Competition Act as being deeply rooted in a dominant 
narrative of a “concentration of ownership of private wealth in the hands of a small number 
of large corporations […] that were in turn controlled by a select group of white families”; 
with the counterpoint of this concentration of private wealth and economic power being the 
dispossession, poverty and unequal and unfair treatment of the majority black population.52 
As a result, Davis states, with specific reference to the Act, that “the preamble and s 2 […] 
enjoin an interpretation of the entire Act which is congruent with the promotion of an 
economy that will benefit all South Africans, will address historical disadvantage, and will 
promote the democratisation of the economy.”53 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 David Lewis Thieves at the Dinner Table: Enforcing the Competition Act (2012) 5. 
53 D M Davis ‘The Development of Competition Law and Economics in South Africa. By Kasturi Moodaliyar 
& Simon Roberts (eds): Book Review’ (2014) 131(3) South African Law Journal 712 at 712. The Preamble 
of the Act states: 
 The people of South Africa recognise: 
That apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices of the past resulted in excessive 
concentrations of ownership and control within the national economy, inadequate restraints 
against anticompetitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions on full and free participation 
in the economy by all South Africans. 
 That the economy must be open to greater ownership by a greater number of 
South Africans. 
That credible competition law, and effective structures to administer that law, are 
necessary for an efficient functioning economy. 
That an efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing the interests of 
workers, owners and consumers and focussed on development, will benefit all South 
Africans. 
IN ORDER TO –  
 
 provide all South Africans equal opportunity to participate fairly in the national economy; 
 
 achieve a more effective and efficient economy in South Africa; 
 
provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the quality and variety 
of goods and services they desire; 
 
create greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete effectively in 
international markets; 
 
 restrain particular trade practices which undermine a competitive economy; 
 
 regulate the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public interest; 
 
 establish independent institutions to monitor economic competition; and 
 
 give effect to the international law obligations of the Republic. 
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With this milieu in mind, the plurality of goals of South Africa’s Act becomes evident:  
Sections 2(c) onwards can be perceived as a recognition of the need for protection from 
competition, as well as encapsulating the potential that competition law has to address the 
injustices of our country’s past through public interest considerations. Furthermore, section 
2(c) onwards encapsulates Kyu-Uck Lee’s narrative of competition policy in developing 
economies, a group of which South Africa forms part, as one that is fair and conforms to a 
social norm where it (competition policy) plays the dual role of raising the power of 
underprivileged economic agents to become viable participants in the competitive industry, 
and establishing the rules of free and fair competition.54  Sections 2 (a) and (b), on the 
other hand, can be perceived as a reflection of the traditional and perhaps mandatory-like 
efficiency motives and considerations that require encapsulation in any effective 
competition law regime, and which can be observed in both the US and EU regimes as 
made evident above, i.e. those that protect and promote the competitive process through 
the advancement of rivalry among market actors, the prohibition of interference with the 
natural flow of competition through exclusionary practices and ensuring that the market 
works freely, to the advantage of the entire citizenry, and that consumers have a wide 
range of choice of product at a competitive price. 55  
 
The former, public interest based components – included in section 2 and the preamble of 
the Act - compared to the latter mandatory-like efficiency considerations, are unique to the 
South African Competition Law Act and the result is that there is “little assistance which 
can be gleaned from other jurisdictions on how to balance the issues of public interest with 
standard cognisable competition considerations.”56 Despite this factor, much of these 
unique intentions and objects of the Act can be gleaned from the actual language thereof 
which, as aforementioned, is profoundly indicative of the historical context from which it 
arose. When balancing the two competing interests, it is similarly important to reiterate the 
abovementioned words of Professor Lee which resonate with the underlying objectives of 
South Africa’s Act. Those words emphasise that if competition policy does not raise the 
power of underprivileged economic agents to become viable participants in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Kyu-Uck Lee op cit (n48). 
55 Fox op cit (n3) 151; Davis op cit (n53) 712. 
56 Davis op cit (n53) 713. 
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competition process, as well as establish rules of free and fair competition, then unfettered 
competition will result, and a handful of privileged big firms will easily be able to 
monopolize domestic markets, giving rise to public dissatisfaction, as the game will not be 
seen to be played in a socially acceptable, fair manner.57 It is now plain that the existence 
of the public interest considerations in the Act cannot only be attributed to South Africa’s 
historical context, but also to the role that they play in realising fairness in the competitive 
game; fairness understood in its extensive sense as outlined above. 
The Nature and Purpose of South African Competition Law: An Incongruity with 
Exclusive Leases 
 
The various purposes enshrined in South Africa’s Competition Law regime are profoundly 
jeopardised by the practice of exclusive leases in the shopping centre context. In the pages 
that follow, it will be demonstrated that exclusive leases negatively impact the specific 
purposes enshrined in sections 2(a) – (c) and (e) of the Act. Whether the Competition 
Commission adequately balanced and considered social and efficiency interests (within the 
terms of their proper meanings that have been discussed above) in order to achieve a well-
rounded sense of justice when arriving at their conclusion that exclusive lease agreements 
did not satisfy the tests in the Act to justify a claim or produce anticompetitive effects, will 
be examined in the following pages. Specific reference to the aforementioned sections and 
the manner in which exclusive leases violate their substance will be predominantly focused 
on in the section that determines whether exclusives have the effect of substantially 
preventing or lessening competition in a market. 
 
It is instructive in the first instance to undergo an impartial assessment of exclusive lease 
agreements, namely the nature thereof, the incentives therefor and repercussions thereof. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Kyu-Uck Lee op cit (n48). 
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Nature of Exclusive Lease Agreements58 
 
The type of exclusive lease agreements upon which this paper focuses, are those within a 
shopping centre context where the lessee or tenant is a retail store or supermarket and the 
lessor is a developer or landlord of land that has been purchased for the purpose of 
conducting the business of a shopping centre. These particular exclusive clauses in 
shopping centre lease agreements impose limits on the use of the shopping centre’s other 
leasable premises;59 the most common of exclusivity clauses within the shopping centre 
context – and the type around which this paper centres - are those that, at the behest of the 
lessee, prohibit the lessor from renting space in the shopping centre to other general or 
specialised businesses that would compete with the lessee’s store, and/or grant the lessee 
the exclusive right to sell certain lines of merchandise within the centre.60 Such clauses 
ultimately prohibit landlords from permitting excessive competition from another 
supermarket and speciality food store in the same shopping centre.61 
Incentives for, and Repercussions of Exclusives in Shopping Centre Leases  
 
The common practice of including long-term exclusives in lease agreements has been said 
to stem primarily from a landlord’s need to secure the necessary funds for financing the 
construction of the centre which is to be built on the purchased land.62 Pollack explains 
that credit-providing institutions are, unsurprisingly, more inclined to finance a shopping 
centre if they are satisfied that the venture will be successful and longstanding; integral to 
the assurance of such attributes in a shopping centre scheme is the presence of large 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The term ‘exclusive lease agreements’ will be used interchangeably with ‘exclusives’, ‘exclusive clauses’ 
or ‘exclusivity clauses in lease agreements’. 
59 Emmanuel B. Halper ‘Supermarket Use and Exclusive Clauses’ (2002) 30 (2) Hofstra Law Review 297 at 
299. 
60 David C. Baum ‘Lessors’ Covenants Restricting Competition’ (1965) University of Illinois Law Forum 
228 at 228; Benjamin Pollack ‘Shopping Center Leases’ (1960-1961) University of Kansas Law Review 379 
at 389; Alan Schapiro ‘Exclusive Rights Clauses in Shopping Centre Leases’ (1985-1986) 24 Alberta Law 
Review 510 at 510. 
61 Halper op cit (n59) 299. 
62 Morris L. Sweet ‘Tenant-Selection Policies of Regional Shopping Centers’ (1959) Journal of Marketing 
399 at 399. 
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retailer tenants that are historically successful,63 have ‘pulling power’ – the ability to attract 
foot traffic into the centre– and can ‘anchor’ the centre for an extended period of time. 64  
 
The success of supermarkets – and their consequent attractiveness for shopping centre 
developments - can be attributed mainly to their provision of optimum convenience for 
consumers: a wide variety of products are conveniently situated in one place and displayed 
on shelves in an accessible and organized way; the opening hours are usually long, further 
catering to convenience; the existence of various brands and their differing prices allow 
consumers to make comparisons and save money. Reardon, Timmer and Barrett et al 
attribute the consumer demand for supermarkets to: 1) urbanization: the entry of women 
into the work place increased the desire for shopping convenience and processed foods 
which save cooking time and 2) the reduction in processed food (which forms the bulk of 
supermarkets’ merchandise) prices as a result of the increased level of production thereof 
(economies of scale) as well as greater variety made available.65 
 
A further incentive to include a supermarket in a shopping centre will originate from the 
shrewd business acumen of the lessor. Since most families do their shopping at a 
supermarket, when a supermarket is in a shopping centre, consumers are within strolling 
distance of the other stores in the centre, creating a better chance of consumers exploring 
the other stores, making the leasable space within the centre more appealing to other 
merchants, thus creating further profit for the landlord as demand in the centre exists.66  
 
It is evident from these considerations that it is the lessor who ‘needs’ the supermarket 
more than the supermarket ‘needs’ the lessor. The supermarket lessee is thus in a strong 
bargaining position, as it is mindful of its appeal to both consumers and shopping centre 
landlords alike, and this may result in pressure being placed on the landlord to accede to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Thomas Reardon, C. Peter Timmer, Christopher B. Barret & Julio Berdegué ‘The Rise of Supermarkets in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America’ (2003) American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (5) 1140 at 1141. 
64 Pollack op cit (n60) 379. 
65 Reardon et al op cit (n63) 1141.  
66 Halper op cit (n59) 299. 
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the demands of the supermarket lessee, and for the supermarket lessee to abuse this 
powerful position that it finds itself in. 67  
 
One of the forms of abuse that may be discharged by supermarkets is through the unlawful 
restriction of competition. The obvious incentive, accomplished through the inclusion of an 
exclusive, of the supermarket lessee is to dilute any competition which may encroach on its 
territory by selling similar goods, and thereby threaten its sales of goods and resultant 
profits. Referred to by Sweet as ‘tenant selection policies’, exclusives are said by him to 
have the general effect of planning or limiting competition, protecting against undue 
competition from new tenants and limiting the introduction of new merchandise lines by 
existing tenants.68 The power given to tenants, through exclusives, over the selection of 
additional tenants to the centre as well as over other existing tenants’ merchandise 
operations, has the result of excluding and keeping at a distance other retailers from 
shopping centres wherein the tenant utilizes space. It is this very incentive and 
repercussion with which this paper concurs, remains concerned with and shall develop 
upon later in light of specific competition law concerns in the context of section 5(1) of the 
Act. 
 
In order to decipher whether this planning or limiting of competition and protection against 
undue competition justifies a claim under the South African Competition Act, an 
identification first of the relevant and applicable sections in the Act is required, and 
secondly an analysis determining whether such agreements are anticompetitive in terms of 
the essential elements and tests demanded of those sections is required. It is instructive, 
however, to precede this practical analysis with a concise explanation of the events that led 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Sweet op cit (n62) 400. 
68 Sweet supra (n67) at 399. 
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The Competition Commission 
 
The Competition Commission is one of the institutions that are responsible for the 
application of the Act.69 The Competition Commission is responsible for, inter alia, the 
investigation, control and evaluation of restrictive practices and abuse of dominant 
positions. The Commission’s strong powers of investigation ensure the objective of 
making markets work better through the promotion of effective competition and by 
regulating the conduct of businesses.70 Part of the Competition Commission’s mandate is 
thus to investigate all complaints, which can be brought by any person, 71 of prohibited or 
anticompetitive practices across South Africa’s economy. 
‘The Supermarket Investigation’72 
 
In 2009, the Competition Commission initiated an investigation into the four major 
supermarkets: Pick ‘n Pay, Shoprite/Checkers, Woolworths and Spar as well as the two 
major wholesaler-retailers: Massmart and Metcash (“the supermarket investigation”) for 
alleged contraventions of the Competition Act. The investigation followed from 
preliminary research within this sector where the following competition concerns were 
highlighted: long term exclusive lease agreements, information exchange, category 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Minette Neuhoff (ed), Marylla Govender & Martin Versfeld et al A Practical Guide to the South African 
Competition Act (2006) 18. The other two institutions responsible for the application of the Act are the 
Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court. 
70 Kasturi Moodaliyar & Simon Roberts (eds) The Development of Competition Law and Economics in South 
Africa (2012) ix; Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 19. 
71 Section 49B(2) of the Act. 
72 The official Competition Commission report was unavailable for perusal for this paper due to 
confidentiality issues; the following account appears from the Competition Commission’s media releases and 
legal firms’ reports: Ian Jacobsberg & Janine Reddi ‘The War of the Titans’ available at 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/the-war-of-the-titans-12-01-2013/ accessed on 18 February 2014; Media 
Release: 27 January 2011 ‘Competition Commission Findings of the Supermarket Industry Probe’ available 
at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Supermarket-Investigation-Release.pdf accessed 
on 18 February 2014; Media Release: 24 January 2014 ‘Commission non-refers Supermarkets Investigation’ 
available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Commission-non-refers-supermarkets-
investigation.pdf accessed on 18 February 2014; ‘The Supermarket Investigation: Progress Report’ available 
at https://www.ensafrica.com/news/the-supermarket-investigation-progress-
report?Id=195&STitle=competition%20ENSight accessed on 18 February 2014; Neil Gopal ‘Property 
Owners Urge Competition Commission Action against Pick n Pay, Spar, Shoprite’ available at 
http://www.biznews.com/property/2014/10/07/property-owners-urge-competition-commission-to-act-against-
pick-n-pay-spar-shoprite-neil-gopal/ accessed on 19 February 2015. 
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management and concentration of buyer power. In 2011 the Commission publicly 
announced that there was insufficient evidence to show a contravention of the Act with 
respect to information exchange, category management and concentration of buyer power; 
however, it remained concerned with long term exclusive lease agreements which it 
believed may indeed amount to a contravention of the Act, especially in circumstances 
where supermarkets have market power. 
 
The types of exclusive leases with which the Commission was concerned, related to those 
that give supermarkets, who play a role as ‘anchor tenants’ – which typically provide 
tenants with a lease of a minimum period of ten years with renewal options up to 40 years - 
the sole right to trade as food retailers in the shopping centre or property development 
which they are situated. The exclusivity agreements often also include restrictions on the 
type of non-supermarket tenants the landlord can allow in the centre, thereby preventing 
bakeries, butcheries and other part-line stores from entering the centre in question. The 
primary potential concerns that such agreements raised for the Commission were: 
 
1) The heightening of entry barriers for smaller and independent firms; 
2) Anticompetitive effects in circumstances where the Supermarket chains have market 
power within the relevant local markets. The Commission stated that it believed 
exclusive leases in these local markets to be unjustified and resulting in the 
anticompetitive outcome of enabling supermarkets to maintain their position of market 
power. 
  
As stated in their media releases - a summarized reflection of their official report on the 
Supermarket Investigation - the Competition Commission found that exclusivity clauses 
stand to be considered under section 5(1), 73 section 8(c) 74 and section 8(d)(i) 75 of the Act. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 5.  Restrictive vertical practices prohibited 
(1) An agreement between parties in a vertical relationship is prohibited if it has the effect of 
substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market, unless a party to the 
agreement can prove that any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, gain 
resulting from that agreement outweighs that effect. 
74 8. Abuse of dominance prohibited 
 It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
 […] 
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Another section clearly affected by exclusive lease agreements of this type, is not only the 
objects clause (section 2) generally - as outlined above in the section discussing the nature 
of South African Competition Law - but also section 2(e).76 Despite the inability of the 
section 2 concerns to raise a cause of action themselves, they are, and will be shown to be, 
useful interpretive aids in reaching a conclusion of anticompetitiveness in the section 5(1) 
context. Potential public interest concerns enshrined in the objects clause, attention to 
which will be specifically directed at the applicable moment, raised by exclusivity clauses 
also stand to be considered. Several months after the investigation the Competition 
Commission concluded with findings that, despite the barriers raised by the practise to 
entry into grocery retailing, there was not sufficient evidence to meet the tests set out in the 
Act to demonstrate anticompetitive effects.  
 
In order to decipher whether the Competition Commission’s contention has any justifiable 
basis, that is, that the tests required by section 5(1) of the Act required to prosecute a firm 
and impose a blanket prohibition on exclusivity clauses in lease agreements, were not met, 
it is necessary to meticulously examine the way in which each element of section 5(1) of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the anti-
competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other 
procompetitive gain; 
75 8. Abuse of dominance prohibited 
 It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
[…] 
(d) engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show 
technological, efficiency or other procompetitive gains which outweigh the anticompetitive 
effect of its act – 
 (i) requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a competitor. 
76 2. Purpose of Act 
The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order – 
 […] 
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy;  
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The Restriction of Competition – A Potential Contravention of Section 5(1) of the Act 
 
The Competition Commission stated that exclusivity clauses stand to be considered under 
section 5(1) of the Competition Act. Section 5(1) of the Act prohibits restrictive vertical 
practices by stating that: 
 
‘An agreement between parties in a vertical relationship is prohibited if it has the 
effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market, unless a 
party to the agreement can prove that any technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive, gain resulting from that agreement outweighs that effect.’ 
 
A thorough consideration of the salient elements of this section is required in order to 
justify the Commission’s conclusion that exclusive lease agreements do indeed stand to be 
considered under section 5(1) of the Act, and more importantly, whether exclusive lease 
agreements, when considered under section 5(1), do not demonstrate anticompetitive 
effects justifiable of a referral to the Tribunal for prosecution. Due to both its extreme 
significance and convolutedness in the exclusive lease agreement context, the first element 
of section 5(1) that will be analysed is that of market definition. 
‘…has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market…’ 
 
‘By affording statutory recognition to the concept of the “market” in the Act, the 
legislature has ostensibly accepted an essential prerequisite for sound competition 
analysis, namely identifying and circumscribing the relevant market in which 
effective competition is perceived to be under threat.’77 
 
For the sake of practicality, the second element, ‘in a market’, of this two-stage enquiry 
will be elaborated upon first. Due to the fact that competition takes place in a market, in 
order to illustrate that competition has been substantially prevented or lessened in a 
market, the relevant market in which the competing parties compete and where 
competition is allegedly prevented or lessened, must first be defined or delineated.78 
Neuhoff et al have defined the relevant market for the purposes of a section 5(1) enquiry as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Pierre E. J. Brooks ‘Defining a “Market” in South African Competition Law’ (2001) 13 SA Mercantile 
Law Journal 269 at 269. 
78 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 97. 
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referring to the arena of competition that is relevant to the issue under investigation, 
namely the products, geographic area and level of supply chain relevant to the analysis.79  
 
Case law has demonstrated that defining the relevant market is not as complex and intricate 
an inquiry as that which may appear from the aforementioned formal denotation provided 
by Neuhoff et al. Brooks goes as far as stating that ‘one is left with the impression that the 
Tribunal follows an intuitive approach in determining the product and geographic 
dimensions of a market.’80 The jurisprudence of the Competition Tribunal reflects this 
position. In The Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd,81 a relevant 
market definition was not arduously or formally defined via a meticulous consideration of 
the products, geographic area or level of supply chain. The two markets judged to be the 
relevant ones were simply those of travel agency sales of domestic flights in South Africa 
and scheduled domestic flights in South Africa.82 A similarly loose relevant market 
categorisation was stated in Mandla-Matla Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Independent Newspapers 
(Pty) Ltd83 where the relevant market was considered to be that of the distribution of 
newspapers in the isiZulu language newspaper market, and in Uniplate Group (Pty) Ltd v 
New Number Plate Requisites CC84 it was again loosely defined as that relating to the 
manufacturing and supplying of blank number plates in the Gauteng area.85 In Imperial 
Holdings Ltd and National Airways / Finance Corporation Limited86 the relevant market 
was defined as that of the small aircraft charter market as opposed to the chartering and 
leasing of large commercial aircraft. In light of the aforementioned, it is contended that a 
simple, logical categorization of the product and geographic market involved is necessary 
for the relevant market inquiry. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Ibid. 
80 Brooks op cit (n77) 279. 
81 [2005] 2 CPLR 303 (CT) (South African Airways) Despite South African Airways being centred around a s 
8 abuse of dominance enquiry, a comparison can be drawn between a s 8 and s 5(1) enquiry with respect to 
the requirement of defining a relevant market: It was held in South African Airways that it needs to be 
established that dominance is present in respect of some market for the conduct alleged to be abusive or 
unlawful; This logically entails that a s 5(1) enquiry would require the need to establish that there was a 
substantial prevention or lessening of competition in respect of some market in order for the agreement under 
discussion to be prohibited. 
82 South African Airways supra (n81) at 319. 
83  [2006] 2 CPLR 499 (CT) (Mandla-Matla) 517. 
84 [2013] 1 All SA 231 (GSJ) (Uniplate) 
85 Uniplate supra (n84) at 239. 
86 (24/LM/Feb00) [2007] ZACT 7 (Imperial Holdings) at para 6-7. 
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An analysis of the structure of the market, that is, the position of the party accused of the 
contravention in that respective market, is necessary.87 The position of the party in respect 
of the market will be decisive in determining whether that party has market power, in other 
words, it will determine whether that party possesses such a high market share that it has 
the ability to raise prices above the competitive level in that market,88 and behave 
independently of its competitors. If a firm is positioned in a market such that it has the 
ability to raise prices and exclude competition, then it will be inferred that the firm has 
monopoly power.89 The more prominent either the upstream supplier or downstream buyer 
is in their respective markets, the more likely a lessening of competition will be as a result 
of a restrictive vertical agreement.90  
The Relevant Market and Market Structure - The U.S. Position 
 
The position of the United States provides clarity on the matter and further vindicates the 
South African position regarding the manner in which to define the relevant market and the 
structure thereof, should the position be unclear in any given set of circumstances. In E.I. 
du Pont Justice Reed lays out the test to determine the relevant product market in a given 
inquiry by stating that whether a product forms part of a given market is dependant upon 
the availability of alternative commodities for buyers; that is, whether there is a cross 
elasticity of demand between the products in question.91 Reed continues to declare that to 
determine whether products are interchangeable, various aspects from the perspective of 
the consumer92 must be considered, such as the purchase of competing products for similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 98. 
88 This is an abridged definition of market power which was declared by Lewis TC in Natal Wholesale 
Chemists (Pty) Ltd v Astra Pharmaceutical Distributors (Pty) Ltd [2001 – 2002] CPLR 363 (CT).  
89 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1956) 351 U.S. 377 (E.I. du Pont) at 391. E.I. du Pont is 
the U.S. authority for the definition of monopoly power which is ‘the power to control prices or exclude 
competition’. This definition can be equated with South Africa’s definition of ‘market power’ which means 
the power of a firm to control prices, or to exclude competition, or to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers, or suppliers.  
90 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 98. 
91 E.I. du Pont op cit (n89) at 400. 
92 Defining the relevant market from the perspective of the consumer is also emphasized in the widely cited 
case of United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 374 U.S. 321 (1963) at 360-361. 
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uses considering the price, characteristics and adaptability of the competing products.93 In 
other words, the functional substitutability of the products must be looked at, as well as the 
responsiveness of the sales of a product to a price change – whether a consumer will turn 
to another product in the face of that price change. In E.I. du Pont, Chief Justice Warren 
for the dissent noted that when du Pont raised its price of cellophane, its earnings went up; 
thus resolving that consumers did not turn to other flexible packaging materials as a 
substitute for cellophane, meaning that other flexible packaging materials did not form part 
of the relevant product market.94 Therefore, one way of determining the relevant product 
market is to hypothesize a price increase and pose the question of – given this increase, 
what will the consumer do? 
 
 A similar stance is taken with respect to the determination of the relevant geographic 
market, which seeks to determine what the geographic area is in which the firms compete 
and thus determines which are the players in the market the firm, that is the focus of the 
inquiry, is actually up against. United States v Grinnell Corp.95 confirms this consumer-
oriented parallelism with the relevant product market determination by stating that the 
relevant geographic market is again defined from the perspective of the consumer, where it 
is hypothesized where the consumer will turn to – that is, which geographic area the 
consumer will go to - in the event of a price increase.96 The geographic market can also be 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 E.I. du Pont op cit (n89) at 380. 
94 E.I. du Pont op cit (n89) 422. 
95 384 U.S. 563 (1996) (Grinnell). 
96 Grinnell supra (n95) at 588. 
97 Grinnell op cit (n95) at 575. 
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The Relevant Market in Exclusivity Clauses in Shopping Centre Leases 
The Product Market 
 
“In case of a product it may be of such a character that substitute products must 
also be considered, as customers may turn to them if there is a slight increase in the 
price of the main product. […] [C]ommodities reasonably interchangeable make up 
that ‘part’ of trade or commerce which § 2 protects against monopoly power.”98 
 
Based on the above considerations, it can be deduced that the relevant market requiring 
analysis in the context of a supermarket tenant and a shopping centre landlord, where an 
exclusive lease agreement is in place and a section 5(1) analysis is relevant, can be said to 
be that of the downstream market consisting of retailers; specifically those comprising of 
supermarkets or other stores that have as their common aim the sale of similar, fungible 
everyday products and brands for consumption or utilisation by the ultimate consumer. The 
specific product market relevant to the inquiry is thus the selection of goods that are 
typically stocked by supermarkets. For example, supermarkets, by definition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary, generally sell foods and household goods, the former of which may be 
perishable or non-perishable. Therefore, included in this market are not only other 
supermarkets, but also smaller, independent speciality businesses that sell one or more 
products that are fungible with those sold by the wider-range-holding supermarkets or 
stores, such as bakeries, butcheries, greengrocers or convenience stores. From the 
consumer’s perspective it can credibly be hypothesized that in the event of a price increase 
of the products of one supermarket or store, a consumer would wish to substitute that 
supermarket or store’s goods with one who has homogenous goods that are cheaper.  
The Geographic Market 
 
In Grinnell the court found the relevant geographic market to be a national one, despite the 
activities of Grinnell’s subsidiaries being conducted on a local scale.99 Brooks notes that 
the failure to take adequate cognisance of consumer interests and their possible responses 
in making a finding on the parameters of a geographic market, is a serious error.100 Brooks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Grinnell op cit (n95) at 571. 
99 Grinnell op cit (n95) at 575. 
100 Brooks op cit (n77) 279. 
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further notes Gellhorn and Kovacic’s criticism of this decision on the basis that the 
geographic market for the services should be defined by the location of the subsidiary that 
conducts its operations, since that is where the effective area of competition occurs, in 
other words, that is where the consumer can turn to buy the service in the event of a price 
increase.101 The geographic area applicable to the enquiry into the relevant market can thus 
be distinguished from Grinnell, and is contended to comprise of that locale that exists 
within the boundaries of the shopping centre.102 The convenience of shopping centres, (as 
discussed above) which motivates many consumers to frequent them, supports the 
contention that a consumer will likely be unwilling to venture outside of the centre for 
his/her shopping needs. It is, however, plausible to hypothesize that in the event of a price 
increase of the products of the exclusive store in the shopping centre, the consumer would 
be motivated to venture somewhere not too far outside of the centre to a shop with cheaper 
goods. The plausibility of this contention is, however, disaffirmed, by a reasonable 
conceptualisation of reality that a consumer would likely factor in the extra travel costs that 
would be incurred due to having to substitute the store within the centre with another store 
outside of the centre. This reasonable conceptualisation of reality is confirmed in the 
findings of various academic writers who have conducted research in the marketing arena. 
Breuckner, Duvenhage, Yale & Ventakesh have noted that Shopping centres enable 
consumers to satisfy their shopping goals at one time, with their attraction towards this 
specific retail format arising from the perceived time economisation that can occur in 
contrast to having to visit numerous locations as is the case with stand-alone stores.103 In 
addition, they note that centres facilitate proximity in location and time and thus provide 
convenience for the consumer in an efficiency sense. Consumers therefore prefer to shop at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid. 
102 As propounded above, in the section titled Incentives for, and Repercussions of Exclusives in Shopping 
Centre Leases, shopping centres have become a prominent, if not the most prominent means by which 
consumers fulfil their supermarket-type shopping needs due to the convenience that is provided by the 
situation of a multiplicity of stores in one confined area. Thus, the shopping centre will be the relevant 
geographic area to which the market enquiry relates, and to which there exists a potential to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition. 
103 Brueckner, J ‘Inter store externalities and space allocation in shopping centres’ Journal Of Real Estate 
Research, (1993) (7) 1 at 5-17; Duvenhage, A. 2014. The Impact of Size and Profitability on Retail Format 
Choice in South Africa. Masters Thesis, available at 
https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10210/12285/Duvenhage,%20A.,%20M.Com.%202014.pdf?seq
uence=1 accessed on 10 January 2015; Yale, L and Venkatesh, A, ‘Toward the Construct of Convenience in 
Consumer Research’ Advances in Consumer Research (1986) 13 at 403-408. 
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malls in an endeavour to reduce search costs. Further research has found that numerous 
stimuli have been exposed as motivations that elucidate why consumers prefer patronising 
malls over stand-alone stores: consumers stated that shopping at a mall satisfied their need 
for entertainment, and notwithstanding the functional and economisation benefits derived 
from shopping in one centralised location, consumers also view shopping at the mall as 
being recreational and allowing them to socialise with friends.104 Survey research has also 
revealed that patrons have felt that shopping at malls provides them with feelings of 
comfort that were closely aligned to aspects of the centre that included: mall security, 
parking space and likelihood to satisfy the entire family’s needs.105  
 
It can thus confidently be asserted that the relevant geographic area can be said to be that 
within the boundaries of the shopping centre, and not a local one too comprising of other 
supermarkets or specialty shops within the consumer’s suburban jurisdiction. 
How to Determine if a Firm has Market Power Via an Analysis of the Relevant 
Market 
 
A specific consideration of existing firms and potential competitors provides an answer as 
to what the relevant market is or comprises. This information is a necessary precursor to 
determine whether market power (i.e. whether a party has the ability to raise prices above 
the competitive level in a market) is present. Pitofsky et al claim that there are three 
considerations of primary importance in distinguishing the relevant firms, that is, those that 
have sufficient influence over a firm’s power to raise price, from the irrelevant. 
The nature of the product and the ability or willingness of users to substitute other 
products for it 
 
As alternative products become less substitutable, their influence on the defendant’s price 
diminishes.106 This can be clarified if one imagines a situation where there are a number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Nicholls, J., Li, F., Mandokovic, T., Roslow, S. and Kranendonk, C ‘US-Chilean Mirrors: Shoppers in 
Two Countries’ (2000) Journal of Consumer Marketing (2) 17 at 106-119; Terblanche, N. ‘The Perceived 
Benefits Derived From Visits to a Super Regional Shopping Centre: and Exploratory Study’ (1999) South 
Africa Journal of Business Management (4) 30 at 141-146. 
105 El-Adly, M ‘Shopping Malls Attractiveness: A Segmentation Approach’ International Journal of Retail & 
Distribution Management (2007) (11) 35 at 936-950. 
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sellers who sell a product that is completely fungible with the product sold by the other 
sellers. In such circumstances, if one seller charges even a slightly higher price than the 
going market price for that product, that seller will find that the sales of his product will 
decrease.107 This can be contrasted with a product that is more highly regarded and 
preferred in a given market and thus not fungible – such as a drug that is more effective 
than any other in treating a disease –; in such a case the seller of that product can curtail 
the production thereof and raise price considerably in the expectation that consumers will 
prefer its product over the existing substitutes.108 
Application and Analysis to Exclusives in Shopping Centre Leases 
 
Based on the consideration of the nature of the product and the ability or willingness of 
users to substitute other products for it, it can confidently be stated that, allowing 
exclusives in a shopping centre with the resultant scenario of there being present only one 
existent seller of specific types of goods in the centre, has the potential to allow that seller 
to raise the prices of the goods above the competitive level. An exclusive in a shopping 
centre lease typically prohibits the existence of stores in the centre that sell products that 
are fungible with those sold by the store imposing the exclusivity clause. The stores that 
remain in the centre will thus be those that do not have products that can be substitutable 
with those sold by the exclusivity-imposing store; depriving a consumer of the ability to 
substitute the goods of the exclusive seller with the goods of another seller of fungible 
goods, produces the result of the former seller being given the uninhibited opportunity to 
raise the prices of its products. In this sense, the exclusive seller in the centre will be said 
to possess market power, that is, the unequivocal ability to raise price and behave 
independently of its competitors - given that none exist within the vicinity to discipline the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Pitofsky op cit (n7) 113. 
108 Ibid. 
	   29	  
Spatial or Geographic Considerations 
 
One factor that impacts the substitutability of alternatives is their location.109 A firm that 
owns every outlet of a particular type of product in one geographic area will still be limited 
by the presence of other independent firms who sell the same product in other geographic 
areas.110 However, based on the assumption that consumers would not be willing to travel 
the extra distance to save a small amount on a substitutable product, the firm who owns 
every outlet in one geographic area may be able to raise his prices above the going rate.111 
Such action would primarily be thought to occur in retail outlets rather than wholesale 
outlets, since in the latter case, even a small difference in price would cause buyers to 
resort to other outlets as such a contrast becomes significant when buying in bulk.112 
Application and Analysis to Exclusives in Shopping Centre Leases 
 
Regarding the spatial or geographic considerations, in a shopping centre which is anchored 
by one supermarket-type store, it has been shown to be highly dubitable that a consumer, 
who likely frequents the shopping centre due to the convenience it provides,113 will be 
willing to travel the extra distance to a different store with substitutable products. As stated 
above, such a consumer should be expected to take into account the extra travel costs 
required to visit the alternate store outside of the centre; this cost further giving substance 
to the improbability of the consumer’s willingness to substitute a different store.  This 
reality of the separate locality of another store, and the isolation that the store imposing the 
exclusive operates in, negates the possibility of its pricing practices being disciplined, 
amounting to the conclusion that such a store will possess a high market share within the 
relevant market and be able to raise its price without being kept in line by other stores, and 
act independently, thus confirming its market power. 
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The Prospect of New Competition 
 
Another factor that may limit a firm in its power over price is the prospect of new entrants 
into the relevant market.114 An existing firm may be perturbed from raising its prices too 
high and reaching too high a profit margin if it remains conscious of the possibility that a 
new firm may want ‘a piece of the pie’ and set itself up as a competitor with the existing 
firm. The likelihood of a new firm entering the market depends on various factors such as 
the expense associated with obtaining space, the availability of raw materials and skilled 
personnel and the cost of obtaining a satisfactory share of the market (advertising etc.).115 
In United States v. Waste Management, Inc. and EMW116 the court looks to whether there 
is ease of entry into the market in order to determine the market power of a firm, and takes 
into account the timeliness, the likelihood and the sufficiency of entry into the market in 
order to determine whether a firm’s actions will be disciplined. As these barriers to entry 
become more imposing, the likelihood of new competition declines and the influence of 
such a firm over the pricing policy of an existing firm diminishes.117 
 
Application and Analysis to Exclusives in Shopping Centre Leases 
 
Potentially the most decisive of considerations in support of the existence of market power 
of an exclusive-imposing supermarket in a shopping centre, is that of the prospect of new 
competition. Through an exclusive, a supermarket completely eliminates the prospect of 
new entrants into the shopping centre, thereby removing the discipline mechanisms (in the 
form of competitors) in the relevant market. A typical exclusive in the relevant context will 
be a long-term one, thereby decreasing the timeliness of entry into the market; due to this 
factor, too, the likelihood of entry into the market is nullified. The sufficiency enquiry 
from Waste Management relates to whether a potential entrant will have a sufficient impact 
on the relevant market to be considered a notable competitor to the firm with market 
power. In the current context, this enquiry is superfluous due to the fact that the exclusive 
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produces no occasion for entry into the market. Faced with no competition, the exclusive-
imposing supermarket will indubitably have market power; consequently have the ability 
to raise prices above the competitive level and act independently.  
Identification of the Relevant Market through the Existence of Market Power: Lewis 
TC’s Approach in Natal Wholesale Chemists – A Critique: Placing the Cart Before 
the Horse 
 
“[…] it would be pointless to consider an agreement, decision or practice by reason 
of its effect if those effects were to be taken distinct from the market in which they 
are seen to operate…”118 
 
In Natal Wholesale Chemists (Pty) Ltd v Astra Pharmaceutical Distributors (Pty) Ltd119 it 
was stated by the Competition Tribunal, in the context of an exclusive distribution 
agreement, that it is not a necessary precursor to an enquiry into an alleged restrictive 
practice to obtain a formal market definition.120 This justification owing to the fact that the 
purpose of defining a relevant market is to identify the exercise of market power, market 
power being defined in s 1 (xiv) of the Act as “the power of a firm to control prices, or to 
exclude competition or to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers or suppliers.’121 
 
Lewis TC enunciates in Natal Wholesale Chemists that: 
 
“When examining the exclusive vertical agreements, rather than attempting to 
define the relevant market in the abstract, we will ask ourselves whether the 
exclusionary right will give one or both parties to the arrangement the power to 
raise prices in the market. Competition will be harmed only if, as a result, prices 
can be raised above the competitive level.”122 
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According to Lewis TC, then, if the exercise of market power, as defined, is identified, 
then a market relevant for the purposes of the enquiry will have been identified.123 For 
example, if the firm in question is able to raise appreciably the price of its product without 
occasioning a significant reduction in demand - then a market relevant for the purposes of 
the enquiry will have been identified.124 Therefore, it is the determination of whether a 
firm possesses market power that needs to be deciphered in order to ascertain whether 
there is a relevant market;125 in short, stating that the act of establishing an exercise of 
market power is equivalent to the identification of the relevant market.126  
 
This position appears to be contrary to both the U.S. method as well as the aforementioned 
South African cases.127 The former unequivocally states that “…without a definition of 
[the] market there is no way to measure [the defendant’s] ability to lessen or destroy 
competition.”128 In other words, the relevant market must first be defined in order to see 
whether a firm within such a market has market power. In Lewis TC’s abridgement of the 
Act’s definition of market power, he states that a firm will have market power if it is able 
to raise prices above the competitive level in the market. Knowing, however, what the 
market relates to and the main and relevant participants or competitors therein, in order to 
make this determination, seems a necessary precursor to this enquiry. Further, an enquiry 
into the ability of the firm to raise prices above the competitive level in the market requires 
knowledge of what the competitive price level in the market is, and this requires an inquiry 
into who determines or has an influence on the competitive level in the market. A firm’s 
power to raise prices is limited mainly by the existence of other producers who, by failing 
to raise their prices, would take over enough of the firm’s business such that the price rise 
would be unprofitable for the firm.129 The primary obstacle that arises is determining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 “A restrictive practices investigation […] is concerned with […] identifying an exercise of market power 
– in this type of analysis the act of establishing an exercise of market power is equivalent to the identification 
of the relevant market” (Natal Wholesale Chemists op cit (n116) at 377, footnote 20). 
124 Natal Wholesale Chemists op cit (n116) at 377. 
125 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 27. The definition of market power will be further expounded on in the 
upcoming sections, it is included in this section due to its inextricable link to an enquiry into the relevant 
market. 
126 Natal Wholesale Chemists op cit (n116) at 377 (footnote 20). 
127 South African Airways op cit (n81); Mandla-Matla op cit (n83); Uniplate op cit (n84) 
128 Walker Process Equipment, Inc v Food Machinery & Chemical Corporation 382 U.S. 172 (1965) at 177. 
129 Pitofsky op cit (n7) 112.  
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“which existing firms and potential competitors have sufficient restraining influence on the 
defendant’s power over price to warrant their inclusion in the ‘relevant market’”.130 If a 
market definition or delineation is left out, as Lewis TC would have the one do, it may 
result in irrelevant upstream or downstream parties, or geographic areas being taken into 
consideration which, in turn, could affect the market power enquiry; or it could result in an 
oversight/ leaving out of important products or geographic areas which are relevant to the 
market and this could also affect the market power enquiry. It seems vital to include this in 
the inquiry if one wishes to receive an accurate determination of whether a firm is able to 
raise its prices above the competitive level. 
 
It is thus concluded that the Competition Commission, when adequately performing a s 
5(1) analysis, would have to have made a determination of the relevant market in order to 
decipher whether the firms in question had market power.131 
Application to Exclusives in Shopping Centre Leases – An Inevitable Conclusion 
 
Despite the potential confusion that arises from Lewis TC’s approach, the same, inevitable 
conclusion can be drawn with respect to the question as to whether an exclusive-imposing 
supermarket has market power: it can rationally be stated that the agreement between the 
supermarket and the shopping centre landlord will provide the former with the ability to 
raise appreciably the price of its product without occasioning a significant reduction in 
demand,132 thereby proving market power according to Lewis TC’s approach. It can 
similarly be rationally stated that, based on above analysis of the relevant market, an 
exclusive-imposing supermarket within a shopping centre will indeed possess market 
power. 
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131 In addition and although not expanded on to a thorough extent in this paper, this position holds too in the 
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context in which it occurs, and a definition of the relevant product and geographic markets is first necessary. 
(Richard Whish and David Bailey Competition Law 7 ed (2012) 125-127). 
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‘…the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition…’ 
 
“Whether there has in some respect been a substantial prevention or lessening of 
competition in [a] market is a factual enquiry. Unless that enquiry generates an 
affirmative answer the existence of an agreement […] is irrelevant…”133 
 
The above statement by Wallis AJA in Netstar justifies the motives of this paper’s 
structure with its initial determination of whether there has been a substantial prevention or 
lessening of competition, before its turn to whether an agreement between the parties in a 
vertical relationship exists, which will appear in the final paragraphs. As the argument will 
unequivocally produce an affirmative determination of a substantial prevention or 
lessening of competition, the latter component of section 5(1) of whether an agreement 
between the parties in a vertical relationship exists, will be considered thereafter. 
 
Some agreements have as their very object the restriction or prevention of competition, 
such as the practice of minimum resale price maintenance,134  which is irrebuttably 
presumed to be anticompetitive and harmful to consumers by its very nature; such 
agreements would be subject to the per se rule, meaning that the defendant may not bring 
forth any evidence to show the reasonableness of the restraint, its mere occurrence will 
result in liability.135 Where it is not possible to say that the object of an agreement is to 
restrict competition, however, it is necessary to conduct an extensive analysis of its effect 
on the market before it can be said to violate section 5(1) and be found to substantially 
lessen or prevent competition.136  U.S. jurisprudence supports this notion in Indiana 
Federation of Dentists where it was stated by Justice White for the Supreme Court that in 
some cases it may be impossible to prove direct anticompetitive effects, and in such cases 
it is sufficient to prove that the parties to the agreement are able to exercise market power 
through the exclusive arrangement, as a ‘surrogate for the proof of actual detrimental 
effects.’137 The above discussion of exclusive leases’ effect on the market as well as the 
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134 Section 5(2) of the Act 
135 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 88. 
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demonstration and confirmation of market power that an exclusive-imposing supermarket 
inevitably possesses,138 thus has an acute bearing on the anticompetitive effects that are 
likely to result from such a lease. The showing of market power above involved a showing 
of a supermarket’s ability to control prices, exclude competition or behave independently 
of its competitors; it is contended that this fact embodies extremely persuasive evidence of 
an effect of substantially lessening or preventing competition, as it has been interpreted by 
academic writers and Competition law enforcement agencies alike. 
 
In order to demonstrate that an exclusive lease agreement in the shopping centre context is 
proscribed by the Act, it must be shown that the exclusive agreement produces 
anticompetitive effects, which may take various forms. Since the per se rule is inapplicable 
in a section 5(1) context, a rule of reason analysis must be conducted to determine whether 
the agreement substantially prevents or lessens competition. The Competition Tribunal has 
stated that the impact on competition of any form of exclusive arrangement must be 
measured by the extent of foreclosure that results from the agreement, as well as the 
possible detriment that comes to consumer welfare.139 Neuhoff et al explain and expand 
upon this further by stating that evidence of an anticompetitive effect can involve a 
showing of evidence that competitors or customers are foreclosed from entering or 
expanding in a market, and that consumers are being exploited, that is, the agreement 
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Exclusive Lease Agreements Between a Supermarket Tenant and Shopping Centre 
Landlord: the Anticompetitive Effects of Market Foreclosure and Consumer 
Exploitation 
 
‘Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens 
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition 
is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of 




In order to illustrate the anticompetitive effect of exclusive lease agreements in the 
shopping centre context, an invaluable reference, in support of the contentions that will be 
made with respect to market foreclosure and consumer exploitation, is a typical exclusivity 
clause taken from the lease agreement between Pick n Pay and Hyprop Investments in the 
case of Pick n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd v Masstores (Pty) Ltd and Hyprop Investments 
Ltd,142 which provided for the following: 
 
“EXCLUSIVITIES AND LETTING RESTRICTIONS 
 
10.1 Save for the Supermarket [Pick n Pay] and Checkers, the lessor shall not 
permit the following businesses to be conducted in the shopping centre on 
the property: 
 
 10.1.1  a hypermarket or supermarket; or 
 
10.1.2 a store with either a single or several food departments, the 
aggregate square meterage of which exceeds 100 (one 
hundred) meters; or 
 
 10.1.3  a café or delicatessen which sells fresh fish or meat; or 
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Substantial Prevention or Lessening of Competition via Market Foreclosure 
 
In light of the above exclusivity clause, which is a typical construction thereof, it can 
confidently be asserted that an exclusive lease agreement between a shopping centre and a 
supermarket indeed has the effect of foreclosing the market to customers and competitors 
alike. The effect of the agreement is the simple, undisguised exclusion of potential 
competitors (in the form of customers of the landlord, i.e. other supermarkets or specialty 
stores) of the landlord from tenancy in the shopping centre. The product market 
comprising of everyday fungible goods, as well as the geographic market comprising of 
the confined, yet concentrated, locale of the shopping centre is thus reserved primarily for 
the exclusive-imposing supermarket, and the result is that potential customers of the 
landlord, and competitors of the supermarket – who are one and the same – are foreclosed 
from entering or expanding in that market; leaving the former with a monopoly within that 
market.  
 
In Netstar the Competition Appeal Court stated that there may be some overlap between a 
prevention and lessening of competition such that an agreement may both lessen the 
existing level of competition and prevent competition in the future.143 Wallis AJA further 
clarifies the requirement of prevention and lessening of competition by highlighting that 
the words are qualified by the adverb “substantially”, and explains that any particular 
prevention or lessening of competition will be a question of fact in each case, but that the 
very existence of this qualification “demonstrates that what is required is something that is 
neither trivial or speculative.”144 He goes on to say, nonetheless, that if there is strong 
enough evidence to show that, but for the agreement, other persons would probably have 
entered the market and engaged in competition, then the requirement of a substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition will almost certainly be satisfied.145 Applying this 
logic to the context at hand, it is contended that, but for the agreement, other supermarkets 
and/or small specialty stores would probably have entered the market and engaged in 
competition. The justification for this exists in the already- elucidated submission that a 
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shopping centre is, in today’s culture, a highly frequented and extremely popular hub of 
practicality and accessibility for end-consumers; this fact alone undoubtedly creates a 
desire for competitors to attempt to engage in competition therein. The extent of 
foreclosure that exclusive agreements produce in the form of the prohibition and 
consequent complete inability of customers (of the landlord) and competitors to enter or 
expand in the market – can be considered as compelling evidence of a substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition. 
The Exclusion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
 
 
In the above section regarding the nature of South African competition law and the harms 
that it aims to protect against,146 it was explained that the Act embodies a plurality of 
goals, namely those that seek to realise both efficiency and socio-economic or public 
interest objectives. The latter are encapsulated in section 2(c) onwards (although only 
section 2(e) will be dealt with due to its pertinence to the relevant context) and seek to 
accomplish socio-economic objectives through the policy of fairness which includes a 
protection from competition. The purpose and significance of the latter objectives are made 
comprehensible when considered in South Africa’s historical context where the ownership 
structure of the economy was in direct correlation with the state’s discriminatory policies 
and the state-sponsored monopoly under the Apartheid regime.147 
 
Section 2(e) of South Africa’s Act encapsulates one of its explicit purposes which is to 
ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy, meaning that the Act proclaims to protect the interests of small 
and medium-sized enterprises by promoting their access to markets as well as 
acknowledging their rights to participate in the economy.148 An exclusive lease agreement 
between a supermarket and a shopping centre runs in direct contrast to this plain objective 
of the Act. The effect of the exclusive, as outlined above, is to exclude potential 
competitors of the supermarket from entering the market of food and household goods in a 
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shopping centre. The small and medium-sized enterprises that comprise of such 
competitors and who will be excluded from the market as a result of the exclusives, are 
those that specialise in the sale of certain goods that the supermarket also sells, such as 
bakeries, butcheries, greengrocers etc. Kampel rightfully notes that in any defined market, 
a small or medium-sized enterprise will typically hold a market share of 10% or less, and 
there is therefore unlikely to be a substantial prevention or lessening of competition if the 
small or medium-sized enterprise exits the market, or is unable to enter or expand in the 
market.149 However, in the unique market comprising only of the boundaries of the 
shopping centre, the market share of the small or medium-sized enterprise will 
dramatically increase, making its inability to compete in the market, through the 
foreclosure as a result of the exclusive, indeed a substantial lessening or prevention of 
competition. The market share that these specialty small or medium-sized enterprises enjoy 
is further increased if one considers and remains cognisant of the specific culture that 
dominates the consumer preferences of today, especially with regard to perishable foods. 
Genova has noted that younger consumers prefer shopping in specialty stores for products 
such as meats, baked items, cheeses and other deli-type foods.150 In addition, consumers 
have become more conscious of the source of their foods, especially meat, where defining 
characteristics such as ‘free-range’ or ‘grain-fed’ play an important part in their decision as 
to which product to purchase. Genova confirms this by noting that consumers have 
expressed a strong desire to understand more about a store, particularly where it sources its 
foods and who is involved in the various processes.151 Similarly, Solomon observes that 
there has been a noteworthy consumer shift towards products that are natural or organic 
and provided by enterprises that possess core values that are aligned with their own.152 In 
light of this intelligence regarding current consumer trends, it is contended that a small 
specialty store with tenancy in a shopping centre will possess a significant market share in 
the market of perishable foods in a shopping centre, thereby deducing that a substantial 
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prevention or lessening of competition will ensue should such enterprises be excluded 
from the market. 
 
Diminution of Intrabrand Competition 
 
The above-shown consequence of market foreclosure produces the spin-off effect and 
creation of another, separate form of suppression of competition: The diminution of 
intrabrand competition, i.e., the competition between the distributors (wholesalers or 
retailers) of the same products or brands.153 The environment in which an exclusive lease 
agreement subsists, is one in which there is a singular retailer of products; albeit in some 
instances many different brands of the same products. There is thus no other retailer in the 
competitive vicinity against which the singular retailer may competitively price its 
products, resulting in the singular retailer being given carte blanche to price at whatever 
rate it desires. 
 
In Natal Wholesale Chemists The Competition Tribunal stated that it is widely recognised 
that the diminution of intrabrand competition consequent upon exclusive distribution 
agreements is often compensated for by the pro-competitive benefits that enhance the 
ability of the producer to compete against its competitors, that is, by strengthening inter-
brand competition.154 This statement by Lewis TC, reinforced by anti-trust scholarship and 
jurisprudence, can be explained through the following line of reasoning: 
 
Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers who produce the same 
generic product, albeit different brands. 155  An extreme example of a deficiency in 
interbrand competition would be a monopoly, where there is only one manufacturer of a 
specific type of product.156 Intrabrand competition, on the other hand, is the competition 
between the distributors (wholesalers or retailers) of the same brand of products.157 The 
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argument that a diminution of intrabrand competition occurs as a result of vertical 
agreements (such as exclusive distribution agreements), but that this diminution is likely 
compensated for by more intensive interbrand competition, is, in essence, due to the 
distributor’s focus on obtaining competitive advantage for its clients’ (manufacturer’s) 
brands which will intensify competition with manufacturers of other brands that do not 
enjoy the services of the distribution agent.158 Further, when interbrand competition exists, 
that is, where there are many different brands of fungible products, it provides a significant 
check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers 
to substitute a different brand of the same product.159 
 
The above illustration, however, should be regarded as being exclusively applicable to the 
reaching of a conclusion of anticompetitiveness in the exclusive distribution agreement 
context, and not in the shopping centre lease context. As explained below,160 the shopping 
centre landlord and supermarket tenant are not in a typical manufacturer-distributor 
relationship, but rather a service-supplier and customer relationship, and thus the offsetting 
of the diminution of intrabrand competition that results through the enhanced interbrand 
competition in exclusive distribution agreements is not herein applicable. In the current 
context there is a severe diminution of intrabrand competition: a single firm possessing a 
monopolistic position in a market - that is, a single available source for the purchase of 
food and household goods – who wilfully acquired and maintained that position via 
contractual means. Therefore, in an environment where there is a single source available 
for the purchase of fungible goods and brands required for everyday use, the result is a 
complete diminution of intrabrand competition, which, if given the opportunity, the 
Tribunal would likely, deem substantial. 
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Substantial Prevention or Lessening of Competition via Consumer Exploitation 
 
“The ultimate goal of any competition policy is to enhance consumer welfare. The 
premise is that markets are not competitive where it can be shown that prices 
increase or the choice of product or service available to the consumer is limited as a 
result of monopolistic conduct.” 161 
 
Based on the above commentary, as well as the aforementioned jurisprudence of the 
Competition Tribunal (namely that the impact on competition on any form of exclusive 
arrangement must be measured by the possible detriment that comes to consumer welfare) 
the following paragraphs will present evidence of the detrimental effects of exclusive 




Kampel’s above declaration reiterates the viewpoint of the Tribunal, the Appeal Court and 
Neuhoff et al above with respect to the impact on competition of exclusive arrangements 
being measured by detriment to consumer welfare in the form of exploitation; exploitation 
meaning higher prices or restricted choice for the consumer. Being beyond the scope of 
this paper, concrete evidence amounting to actual price increases by an exclusive-imposing 
supermarket will not be revealed or considered.162 However, the mere contemplation of the 
(anti) competitive environment that is created by the arrangement deems such evidence 
redundant, as it is plain to foresee the boundless opportunity, provided by the exclusive 
lease, that the supermarket has to increase prices. This contemplation is supported by the 
following re-statement by Judge Learned Hand in ALCOA:163 ‘Mere size is not an offense 
against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a 
monopoly… but size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored…’ 
Unencumbered by the presence of any competition in the vicinity of the market (both 
geographic and product) to discipline its pricing practices, an exclusive-imposing 
supermarket is left with free reign to charge higher prices to consumers without 
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accountability. Accountability for the supermarket who would inevitably charge higher 
prices, in a free market, would take place via the pricing practices of the competitors, who 
would price at a lower rate than the supermarket, who would in turn be forced to either 
lower its prices or exit the market due to lack of clientele. It is thus asserted, with 
conviction, that an exclusive lease between a shopping centre and a supermarket 
indubitably has a detrimental effect on consumer welfare, by way of exploitation through 
the higher prices that will inevitably be charged. 
 
As outlined above, an exclusive lease agreement produces the effect of foreclosing 
potential competitors from entering or expanding in the market of food and household 
goods in a shopping centre, leaving the exclusive-imposing supermarket with a 
monopolistic position within the relevant market.164 This creation of monopoly that the 
exclusive lease allows for and produces requires mention for the purposes of revealing its 
consumer-detrimental outcome. These dangers of monopoly take the form of injury to the 
consumer from both a monetary and non-monetary perspective, and will be explained via 
the following informal and rudimentary economic analysis:165 A firm with monopoly 
power will be assumed to possess the desire to dictate and raise price, and will seek to do 
so, since it possesses substantial market power. Given the supermarket’s substantial market 
share, consumers are often incapable of acquiring the desired products from another 
supermarket or store, as the exclusive-imposing supermarket is the sole provider thereof. 
Thus, where no substitute offerings are present, the consumer must either incur this new 
higher price, or forgo the offering. If the consumer chooses the latter, as they are unable to 
afford the higher price, the consumer suffers from deprivation of that product, such 
deprivation which can be deemed detrimental to the objective of consumer welfare that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 The definition of monopoly power from E.I. du Pont op cit (n89), is ‘the power to control prices or 
exclude competition’. This definition can be equated with South Africa’s definition of ‘market power’ which 
means the power of a firm to control prices, or to exclude competition, or to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers, or suppliers. It has already been shown in the preceding sections 
that an exclusive-imposing supermarket will possess market power. 
165 This information regarding the effect of a monopoly on consumers was obtained via the means of an 
informal interview, conducted on 20 October 2013, with an Antitrust Law professor from the University of 
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The principles expressed therein comprise predominantly of 
obiter dicta from ALCOA; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Paddock 
Publications v. Chicago Tribune 103 F.3d 42 (1997); United States v. Dentsply International, Inc. 399 F.3d 
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envisaged by the Act. 166 In addition, when demand for the product decreases, the 
manufacturer of the product does not realise economies of scale (where increased 
production results in efficacy that allows for a decrease in cost per unit – this decrease in 
costs translating into a lower price for consumers), and this translates into a higher price of 
the product. Consumers that are unable or unwilling to forego the product are forced to pay 
the higher price, and this results in a wealth transfer from the consumer to the monopolist, 
again breaching the objective of consumer welfare prescribed by the Act. 
Poor Service Delivery 
 
‘[A substantial lessening of competition arises] when it has a significant effect on 
rivalry over time, thereby reducing the competitive pressure on firms to improve 
their offer to customers or become more efficient or innovative.’167 
 
One of the clear purposes of the Act is to promote and maintain competition in order to 
provide customers with competitive prices and product choices.168 The significance of this 
purpose was reiterated in Msomi t/a Minnie Cigarette Wholesalers & others v British 
American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd,169 where the applicants claimed that a vertical 
restriction would eliminate price and service competition amongst distributors; the 
Tribunal upheld this as a valid claim that possessed the potential to substantially lessen 
competition.170 This ‘price and service elimination’ type claim resonates deeply within 
exclusivity in the shopping centre context. The fact that a supermarket acting as the sole 
provider of fungible goods in a relevant market, possesses the extraordinary opportunity to 
raise its prices to an above-competitive level without being disciplined by any competition 
(thereby exploiting end consumers) has been confirmed above; it is the latter claim of 
service elimination, which presently requires justification in order to show an a substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Inter alia, the latter component of section 2(c) states that the purpose of the Act is to advance the social 
and economic welfare of South Africans. 
167 Whish & Bailey op cit (n136) 932. 
168 Section 2(b) of the Act. 
169 [2006] JOL 18326 (CT) (Msomi) at para 42. 
170 Msomi supra (n169) at para 49. 
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A supermarket that enjoys the comfortable position of exclusivity within a shopping centre 
is cognizant of its solitary position and function of the sole provider of certain goods 
within the relevant market. The anchor tenant supermarket will thus possess no incentive 
to improve upon its service delivery, since consumers who frequent that shopping centre 
within which the supermarket possesses tenancy, do not have the choice of boycotting the 
supermarket in the event of poor service delivery, and thus the latter has complete security 
in its customer base. The lack of choice that consumer’s are faced with should not be 
interpreted as meaning that consumers are literally unable to shop at another supermarket. 
Consumers are, of course, able to shop for food and household goods elsewhere, outside of 
the centre, but, as was explained in the sections above, consumers are unlikely to be 
willing to incur the extra travel and time costs that such a venture entails. In addition 
consumers are unlikely to be willing to surrender the convenience that the nature of a 
shopping centre possesses, what with its inclusion of a wide variety of shops that satisfy 
many purchasing requirements at once. The incentive to qualitatively improve various 
elements of the supermarket, and to become more innovative and service-oriented, is, 
made existent by the presence of competition and competitive pressures. With no such 
competition to speak of, compliments of the exclusive lease, such incentives are eliminated 
which is likely to the detriment of the consumer. In the absence of competitive pressures to 
improve and innovate, consumers will likely be exposed to, inter alia, unhelpful and 
uninformed employees, products that may not be fresh or available, an absence of 
promotional benefits such as ‘specials’, and a general upkeep of the supermarket that is 
likely to pertain to the lowest acceptable standards. Such poor service delivery (that not 
unusually comes at a lower cost to the supermarket, and is thus a reasonable probability) 
can be deemed a form of customer exploitation in the context of supermarket exclusives 
that thus act as evidence of a substantial prevention or lessening of competition. 
Restricted Choice 
 
In addition to the inevitable consequences of over-pricing and poor service delivery by the 
supermarket, the consumer, indirectly coerced into settling for the range of products held 
by the exclusive-imposing supermarket (due to the abovementioned postulation that a 
consumer will settle for the supermarket within the shopping centre due to the all-
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inclusive-type convenience encapsulated by the shopping centre as well as the incurrence 
of extra travel and time costs171), will be restricted in his/her choice of product. A 
consumer has the option to purchase those products stocked by the exclusive-imposing 
supermarket and no other. In other words, should the consumer be dissatisfied with, for 
example, the fresh produce or the brand of shampoo that is kept by the exclusive-imposing 
supermarket, the consumer will be unable to seek an alternative within the shopping centre, 
by virtue of the operation of the exclusive. This evidence of restricted choice can be 
deemed a form of consumer exploitation as contemplated by Neuhoff et al172 and thus 
serves as evidence of a substantial prevention or lessening of competition.  
 
Market Foreclosure and Consumer Exploitation: A Breach of the Efficiency 
Objectives of the Act  
 
The above-shown market foreclosure and consumer exploitation are in stark violation of 
the efficiency objectives enshrined in the Act, as expounded on above in the chapter 
headed: ‘South African Competition Law – An Amalgamation of Efficiency and Social 
Objectives’.173 The exclusion of competitors from the relevant market, the extraordinary 
opportunity to charge higher prices, the restriction of choice and potential for poor service 
delivery are all effects of exclusive leases and all stand in violation of sections 2(a) and (b), 
which embody the efficiency goals of the Act. To reiterate, the efficiency motives of the 
Act aim to protect and promote the competitive process through the advancement of rivalry 
among market actors, to prohibit the interference with the natural flow of competition 
through exclusionary practices, to ensure that the market works freely, to the advantage of 
the entire citizenry, and that consumers have a wide range of choice of product at a 
competitive price.174 Upon a reflection of the abovementioned contentions with respect to 
the effects of exclusive leases, it is asserted that each of the stated objectives of the Act 
stands in jeopardy with the operation of exclusive leases agreements in the shopping centre 
context.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Supra ‘The Relevant Market in Exclusivity Clauses in Shopping Centre Leases’. 
172 Supra n137. 
173 Supra p 11 
174 Ibid. 
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‘…unless a party to the agreement can prove that any technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive, gain resulting from that agreement outweighs that effect.’ 
 
An agreement which has been shown to produce the effect of substantially preventing or 
lessening competition in a market (of which exclusives have indeed been shown to do in 
the preceding paragraphs) will have the opportunity for redemption if the respondent can 
show that there exists an efficiency, pro-competitive or technological gain resulting from 
the agreement that outweighs its anticompetitive consequences. 175  Shopping centre 
exclusives are thus capable of being justified on the ground that the losses caused by the 
prevention of competition would be offset by the pro-competitive gains of the agreement. 
Each of the elements of the defence will first be examined and applied to the pertinent 
context and then predictions about what defences exclusive-imposing supermarkets could 
potentially bring, as well as their likely success, will be outlined. 
Economic Efficiency 
Economic efficiency could be said to be realised in the following conditions: where 
allocative efficiency exists, that is, when productive resources are used in an optimal way 
such that all the demand on the market is satisfied.176 As explained above, a firm who 
enjoys market power, such as a an exclusive-imposing supermarket, will seek to raise 
prices, and this will decrease the demand for the more expensive product on the market, as 
some consumers will forgo the purchase. Allocative efficiency is thus not realised through 
the imposition of an exclusive lease agreements as the production capacity of 
manufacturers is not being realised to its full extent. 
 
In some instances a firm’s enjoyment of high market power may be as a result of its 
superior efficiency. This point was highlighted by the Competition Tribunal in Msomi who 
confirmed that competition is typically premised on a plurality of competitors and that an 
efficient market often leads to the culling of inefficient competitors.177 Whether an 
exclusive-imposing supermarket is the most efficient of firms in the market of foods and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 96 and 53 where it is stated that this balancing act is referred to as the 
‘efficiency defence’; Mandla-Matla op cit (n83) at 517. 
176 Supra p 44. 
177 Msomi op cit (n169) at para 44. 
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household goods in a shopping centre is unknown due to the artificial obtainment of 
market that the exclusivity clause in the lease agreement achieves. An efficiency defence 
of this type, will thus likely be unacceptable. 
Pro-Competitive Gain 
A pro-competitive gain would be achieved when it can be shown that conduct or market 
structure leads to a lower price for consumers or assists in opening up markets to 
competition.178 It has been extensively shown in the preceding sections that the conduct of 
and market structure created by an exclusive lease agreement has the inevitable effect of 
leading to higher prices for consumers and foreclosure of the market for potential 
competitors. This defence would thus too fail for an exclusive-imposing supermarket. 
Technological Gain 
Neuhoff et al define a technological gain via the means of an example in the field of 
intellectual property: ‘Patent rights are often criticised for creating monopolies. However, 
it is generally accepted that the awarding of patents encourages innovation and 
technological progress’.179 It is within this context that it could be postulated that an 
exclusive-imposing supermarket respondent would attempt to bring a justification. 
Justifications of an efficiency, pro-competitive or technological type are allowed on a case-
by-case basis,180 therefore, being deprived of the details of the specific justifications 
brought forward by the supermarkets, and since the topic of exclusivity in shopping centre 
lease agreements has not in the past been adjudicated by the Competition Tribunal, it is 
necessary to postulate the possible justifications and defences that may reasonably be 
brought forward by the respondent supermarkets. 
 
A reasonably possible justification could be brought by the respondent which would 
highlight the fact that, in the event that more than one supermarket or store selling the 
same goods as that sold by the supermarket exists in the centre, it is likely that, due to 
homogenous goods stocked by each of the supermarkets or stores, one or both of the stores 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 55. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 53. 
	   49	  
would inevitably close down. The bracket of consumers in the specific locale wherein the 
shopping centre exists will likely not be of great enough a number to result in profits being 
achieved by both of the supermarkets; the result is that a less concentrated amount of 
consumers will frequent both of the existing supermarkets, as opposed to all the consumers 
frequenting the only one that exists, which will result in an achievement of profit and 
return on investments for the supermarket. In addition, if two supermarkets that exist 
within a centre both close down due to the aforementioned rationalisation, then that 
impacts the shopping centre landlord negatively, too, since the presence of a supermarket 
has been shown to generate foot traffic in a shopping centre.181 
 
Despite the plausibility of this justification, in Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk v The 
Competition Commission and Others, 182  the Competition Appeal Court rejected the 
efficiency defences of a firm on the grounds that the efficiencies brought forward could 
still be achieved without resorting to an exclusivity agreement. The same can be said of the 
above efficiency: In a market where competition is able to take place naturally and freely, 
and where competitors compete in a vigorous manner via the means of inter alia 
competitive pricing and innovation  (that is, in a market that is not imposed by exclusive 
leases) the inefficient supermarket or store will be culled from the market without the need 
for the use of an exclusive lease. The majority of consumers who visit the centre will rather 
frequent the store that prices more competitively, pays attention to quality and innovation 
and who, on the whole, is a better and more efficient firm. This postulation of the outcome 
of the natural flow of competition obviates the need for exclusivity in leases, and 
disaffirms the above-mentioned defence that may be brought by the supermarket. 
 
One justification that is public knowledge, is that expounded by Ricky Mann, writing for 
the Competition Commission newsletter, who confirms that one of the numerous reasons 
provided by the supermarket respondents for their behaviour, is ‘the positive externality on 
the shopping centre due to their presence in terms of attracting customers to the centre, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Supra p 15. 
182 (CT 16/CAC/Apr02) [2003] 2 CPLR 247 (CAC) at 499. 
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well as the need to protect the investment in the store and recoup the investment price.’183 
The latter justification has strong resonance with one that is for the sole gain of the 
supermarket itself rather than for the benefit of competition or consumers. Mann further 
dismisses these reasons on the basis that they are incongruent with the standard approach 
taken by supermarkets in their exclusivity leases, which is to apply them in a blanket 
manner and for a long-term duration; this suggests, contrary to the supermarkets’ claim, 
that the reason for exclusivity does not find origin in a case-by-case analysis of the 
probable risk assessment of each investment. 
 
It is contended, therefore that the stated and postulated efficiency defences brought by the 
supermarket respondents above, will undoubtedly fail as being insufficient to outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects of exclusive leases in shopping centres, and that the Competition 
Commission 
‘… In a vertical relationship’ 
 
In order for an agreement184 to constitute a breach of s 5(1) of the Act and be considered a 
prohibited practice demonstrating anticompetitive effects, it must be ascertained that the 
agreement is between parties who are in a vertical relationship. The Act defines a ‘vertical 
relationship’ as “the relationship between a firm and its suppliers, its customers, or 
both.”185 Furthermore, agreements between parties in a vertical relationship have been 
defined to mean those concluded between different parties who occupy different levels of 
the supply chain, such as between a manufacturer or producer of goods or a supplier of 
services (upstream party), and a distributor such as a retailer or wholesaler (downstream 
party) that distributes the manufacturer’s goods.186 In most markets upstream parties or 
producers do not sell the goods that they produce from raw materials directly to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Ricky Mann ‘Commission non-refers supermarkets investigation’, March 2014, available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-Commission-Newsletter-Edition-
48.pdf, accessed on 19 January 2015. 
184 Defined in s 1 as including a ‘contract’ under which a lease agreement falls. 
185 S 1(1)(xxxiii)(c)(ii). 
186 Paul Cook, Raul Fabella & Cassey Lee (eds) Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in 
Developing Countries (2007) 35; Neuhoff et al op cit (n69) 85; Whish & Bailey op cit (n136) 618; Massimo 
Motta Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2004) 302: “Despite the different labels, the relationship is 
of the same nature.” 
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ultimate consumer, but do so through intermediaries such as wholesalers or retailers who 
then go on to sell the goods to the ultimate consumers;187 such firms are said to be in a 
vertical relationship with one another.  
 
Upon consideration of this definition of a vertical relationship, it is difficult to reconcile 
the Commission’s classification of parties to a lease agreement as falling within a vertical 
relationship, since, although we have a downstream party – namely the supermarket who 
distributes goods -, there is conceptual difficulty with placing a landlord of a shopping 
centre in the category of ‘upstream party’. A landlord of a shopping centre is certainly not 
an upstream party in the sense of a producer of goods, however an upstream party is also 
described as a supplier of services,188 and it is within this category that it can be assumed 
the Commission intended to place a landlord of a shopping centre in bringing the practice 
of exclusive lease agreements under section 5(1) of the Act. A landlord of a shopping 
centre, who could be either a natural or legal person, owns land and the buildings on the 
land for the purpose of renting space on the land or within the buildings on the land to 
tenants. A landlord can thus be construed as a supplier of a service, that is, the service of 
supplying land or leasable shopping centre space to suitable tenants for a specified time 
and purpose in exchange for rental payment. A tenant, however, could not, in a 
conceptually logical fashion, be viewed as a downstream party that performs the function 
of distributing the aforesaid services of the landlord to customers, as the tenant is itself a 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Massimo Motta Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2004) 302. 
188 Whish & Bailey op cit (n136) 618. 
	   52	  
The European Union Position – Placing Further Doubt on the Commission’s 
Classification of Exclusives under S 5(1) 
Article 101 (1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)189 
prohibits vertical agreements that prevent, restrict or distort competition, while Article 
101(3) of the TFEU provides for block exemptions, which state that the prohibition in 
Article 101(1) could be declared inapplicable in relation to agreements and categories of 
agreements that fulfil certain requirements, 190 in particular, inter alia, those “practices that 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical 
or economic progress…”. These sections thus substantially mirror section 5(1) of the Act 
and an interpretation of the former can thus be of use to that of the latter. 
 
According to paragraph 26 of the Vertical Guidelines, which sets out the principles for the 
assessment of vertical agreements under Article 101 of the TFEU, an agreement for the 
lease or rental of goods is not assessed as a vertical agreement, as no good or service is 
being sold by the supplier to the buyer. Due to the similarities that exist between article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty). The full 
text of Article 101 reads:  
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question. 
190 Whish & Bailey op cit (n136) 82 and 168; EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010) para (5) (‘Vertical 
Guidelines’) 
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101 and section 5(1), this assessment of article 101 further works against the 
Commission’s classification of exclusive lease agreements as falling under the jurisdiction 
of section 5(1), since such an agreement is for the rental of space. 
 
‘Firm’ – Redemption for the Commission’s Classification of Exclusives under s 5(1) 
The difficulty in classifying the landlord and tenant as upstream and downstream parties in 
order to bring their relationship under the realm of section 5(1), is, however, redressed by 
reverting to the Act’s definition of a vertical relationship, which does not exist in the 
TFEU. ‘Vertical relationship’ is defined in the Act as the relationship between a firm and 
its suppliers, its customers, or both,191 with the term ‘firm’ mentioned therein, further 
defined as ‘[including] a person, partnership or a trust’.192 The use of the word ‘includes’ 
suggests that the list is an inexhaustible one and corporations could thus be included 
thereunder. In addition, ‘person’ is not defined and could thus refer to either natural or 
legal persons, the latter of which a corporation too falls under. 193 Therefore, a firm could 
refer to either the supermarket tenant, (a legal person) who would be in a relationship with 
its landlord supplier, or to the landlord him/her/itself who is in a relationship with its 
supermarket customer (customer in the sense that the supermarket is paying for the 
services of the landlord). Under this line of reasoning, a landlord and tenant could be 
included as those parties falling under the definition of a vertical relationship as defined in 
the Act, and the Commission’s classification under section 5(1) is therefore salvaged in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Section 1(xxxiii)(c)(ii) of the Act. 
192 Section 1(xi) of the Act. 
193 Further support for the contention that person includes legal persons can be found in s 3(1) of the Act 
where it is stated that the Act applies to all economic activity within, or having an effect within, the Republic. 
Economic activity defined as activities that involve production, distribution and consumption of goods and 
services in society (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/economic-activity.html accessed on 11 
April 2014); corporations and other legal persons form part of such economic activities.  
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‘Restrictive vertical practices…’ 
 
Competition concerns are raised in circumstances where a restrictive vertical practice or a 
‘vertical restraint’194 is observed; that is, where the agreement between parties in a vertical 
relationship has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market 
and there is no countervailing technological efficiency or other pro-competitive gain.195 
Motta eloquently explains the nature of vertical restraints and the reasons for their coming 
into existence between parties who are vertically related:  
 
“Consider the classic example of the vertical relationship between a manufacturer 
and a retailer which distributes its products. In general, both the manufacturer and 
the retailer decide on different actions, and what is an optimal action for one is not 
necessarily optimal for the other. As a result, a party can try to use contracts and 
clauses so as to restrain the choice of the other and induce an outcome which is 
more favourable to itself. (To put another way, each party’s actions create an 
externality on the other. Vertical contracts might be used to try to control for these 
externalities.)”196  
 
The above explanation by Motta fuels the need to emphasise that the ‘control’ of these 
‘externalities’ through vertical agreements may not be competitively viable or legal and 
should thus be disallowed due to the effect that they have of substantially preventing or 
lessening competition in a market without a countervailing technological efficiency or 
other pro-competitive gain, to state the exact words of the Act; it is precisely this factor 
which must be considered in the current context of shopping centre exclusives. 
 
There are various forms of vertical restraints that have come into existence, and a brief 
explanation of the potentially pertinent types in relation to the current context will be 
expounded on in order to determine which type, if any, a exclusive lease agreements of the 
kind under examination, falls under. 
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Vertical Agreement Constructions Potentially Applicable to Shopping Centre Lease 
Exclusives 
i) Territorial Restrictions 
 
Territorial restrictions, initiated by an upstream party, limit the geographic territory in 
which a downstream party may resell the upstream party’s product, having the effect of a 
retailer not being allowed to sell a manufacturer’s product outside of a specified 
geographical territory, thereby preventing the retailer from selling the manufacturer’s 
product to customers who reside or have their places of business outside of that area.197  In 
short, the retailer agrees to sell to only a particular customer, that is, those in a specified 
territorial jurisdiction. The primary objective of this restraint is to restrict intrabrand 
competition (the competition between retailers who sell the same brand) and thereby 
control free riding. 198 Free riding occurs when one retailer benefits from the services 
provided by another retailer in relation to a certain product which both retailers sell. For 
example, some retailers supply the service of providing information or demonstrations to a 
customer about a product in order to induce them to buy a product; retailers that provide 
such services usually sell the product at a higher price than those that don’t (for various 
reasons, the most obvious of which is that the latter retailer will have lower costs attributed 
to, inter alia, their lack of employees with sufficient expertise about the various products), 
and thus the latter may benefit from the services of the former, as customers are likely to 
buy from the retailer with the lower price, regardless of who provided him/her with the 
service.199   
 
Through a territorial restriction, a manufacturer insulates its appointed distributors from 
competition from other distributors who sell the manufacturer’s product.200 Manufacturers 
argue that protecting dealers from intrabrand competition supports the former’s desire that 
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customers be attracted to its product through the intensive sales and service efforts by its 
dealers, and sometimes gain a greater return on investment.201 Brand reputation is also 
conserved through the distribution of manufacturer’s products by legitimate, authorized 
dealers. Dealers contend that by being free of intrabrand competition, they can promote the 
product more fully through greater sales and service efforts (as they are protected from free 
riders), and reduce their investment risk.202 
Technical Dissimilarity, Yet Consequential Parallelism 
 
Applying this construction to a shopping centre exclusive is practically difficult and 
unworkable. In order for an exclusive lease agreement between a shopping centre landlord 
and a supermarket tenant to be classified under a territorial restriction agreement, the 
landlord ought to be viewed as a supplier of the service of providing rentable space, and 
the supermarket tenant the exclusive distributor of the landlord’s services within a 
designated territory. The relationship between a lessor and lessee does not represent this 
type of classification, and it is thus dubitable that it was under this construction of a 
vertical restraint that the Commission intended to place exclusives between shopping 
centre landlords and supermarket tenants. 
 
The similarity, however, between territorial restrictions and exclusivity clauses in shopping 
centre leases becomes discernible when one considers the fact that one party is given a 
confined space to conduct their business of running a supermarket, while other parties who 
conduct the same business are restricted from doing so within that space. In other words, 
an exclusive lease agreement in a shopping centre reflects a territorial restriction in the 
sense that one party conducting the business of a supermarket and occupying a specific 
space within the centre, is the only party that is allowed to conduct that particular type of 
business within that space. 
 
Therefore, despite the inability of the parties to be categorised accurately and concretely as 
an upstream manufacturer of goods or supplier of services, and a downstream retailer or 
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distributor of those goods or services, the overall effect that a territorial restriction 
produces is the same as that of an exclusive lease agreement in a shopping centre. It is 
therefore assumed that if the Commission categorised exclusives as a territorial restriction-
type vertical restraint in order to analyse it under s 5(1) of the Act, it is as a result of the 
parallel effects that exist between the two, rather than their technical similarities. 
ii) Exclusive Dealing 
 
An exclusive dealing agreement occurs when a retailer (or downstream party) agrees to 
carry and sell only the brand of a particular manufacturer (or upstream party), subject to 
the threat of refusal to supply by the manufacturer.203  In other words, a buyer purchases its 
requirements exclusively from a single supplier, effectively agreeing not to purchase from 
the supplier’s competitors.204 The effect of such an agreement is that competitor suppliers 
or manufacturers (upstream parties) of other brands of the same product in question are 
denied access to the distribution services offered by the retailer, thereby excluding 
competitors from the marketplace or handicapping their ability to compete.205 
 
The objectives of partaking in an exclusive dealing arrangement have been said to be their 
promotion of more effective distribution by increasing dedication and loyalty, minimizing 
free-riding (thereby increasing output) and ensuring retailers of a reliable source of 
supply.206 
 
In order for an exclusive lease agreement between a shopping centre landlord and a 
supermarket tenant to be classified as an exclusive dealing agreement, the former would 
need to be viewed as an exclusive supplier of services to the latter, the latter agreeing to be 
the only distributor of such services. This, again, is an unworkable application to the lessor 
lessee relationship in the context of an exclusive lease agreement in a shopping centre. It 
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is, however, indeed the case that an exclusive lease agreement in a shopping centre context 
requires the landlord to deal exclusively with one supermarket tenant and not to deal with 
other competitors of that supermarket. In other words, the landlord is required to provide 
rentable space to only one supermarket. Melamed defines exclusive dealing agreements 
generally as agreements in which one party promises to deal exclusively with another and, 
thus not to deal with the competitors of the other.207  
 
Therefore, as was the case with territorial restrictions, the typical technical construction of 
an exclusive dealing agreement is not adhered to in the context of shopping centre 
exclusives, however, the effects thereof, are paralleled; and it is under this parallel effect 
approach that it can be assumed the Commission sought to place exclusivity leases under 
in order to analyse it as a vertical restraint in terms of section 5(1) of the Act. 
iii) Exclusive Distribution 
 
An exclusive distribution agreement is one where a manufacturer agrees to sell his 
products exclusively to one distributor, who alone will distribute the manufacturer’s goods 
in a specific area. 208  The main concerns with such agreements are that intrabrand 
competition will be reduced and that an increase in exclusive distribution may lead to 
foreclosure of other distributors, thereby reducing competition at that level.209 
 
Exclusive distribution agreements have been said to be an incentive to sellers for products 
that are purchased infrequently, and when only a limited market is available for products, 
such as Porsche, BMW or high-end watches.210 
 
In order for an exclusive lease agreement between a shopping centre landlord and a 
supermarket tenant to be classified as an exclusive distribution agreement, the shopping 
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centre landlord would need to be viewed as an upstream party who provides his services to 
only one distributor, who alone distributes those services, namely the supermarket tenant. 
Since the supermarket lessee and shopping centre lessor relationship again cannot be 
rationally reconciled with this construction, it is assumed that, if the Commission intended 
to bring exclusive leases under the exclusive distribution construction in order to analyse 
the former under section 5(1) of the Act, then it would be again based on the parallel effect 
approach: that the effect of an exclusive distribution agreement parallels that of an 
exclusive lease agreement in a shopping centre context, in the sense that it excludes other 
distributors from being able to partake in the distribution of certain products in a specific 
area. 
 
The above analysis represents an attempt to justify the Commission’s placement of 
exclusive lease agreements in shopping centres under the jurisdiction of section 5(1) by 
fitting such agreements into one of the established categories of vertical restraints. Based 
on the above analysis, it is apparent that it is unfeasible to attempt a rigid, technical 
placement of exclusive lease agreements into any of the developed and pertinent categories 
of vertical restraints. However, the parallel effects that exist between the various categories 
and shopping centre exclusives provide a sound basis for the assumption that it was based 
on a purposive approach to the various potentially applicable vertical restraint 
constructions that the Commission adopted in order to place them into one of the 
categories, rather than a literal one.  
Conclusion 
 
Despite the practical inapplicability of shopping centre exclusives to one of the various 
vertical restraint constructions, it does not follow that exclusives do not qualify as a type of 
vertical restraint, since, according to section 5(1), a vertical restraint is observed where the 
agreement between parties in a vertical relationship has the effect of substantially 
preventing or lessening competition in a market and there is no countervailing 
technological efficiency or other pro-competitive gain. Since it has, to the fullest extent 
possible, been shown in the preceding sections of this study, that exclusive shopping centre 
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leases do indeed satisfy these elements, it can conclusively be asserted that the 
Commission’s decision to not refer such a practice to the Tribunal for adjudication, was an 
erroneous one. The dangers and competitively damaging repercussions for South African 
competition law that this failure to prohibit such agreements produce, remain in the market 
today and time will be the only indicator as to whether the Tribunal will alleviate such 
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